An official figure that forces a target review
The Senate’s 2025 accounts document a total catering subsidy of €987,160. This shows that a national €12 million target cannot be validated by extrapolating the Senate alone: a comparable National Assembly cost is required, distinguishing services for parliamentarians, staff and operational obligations. [1]
Separate members’ meals from employee catering
Parliament enjoys administrative and budget autonomy, but this does not prevent internal rules on pricing, transparency and subsidy neutrality. Reform can be implemented by chamber bureaux and quaestors with full-cost disclosure rather than through a broad national statute. [1][2][3]
Price the service without abolishing the tool
The principle should be that prices paid cover at least the avoidable cost of private consumption, while staff collective catering remains available under applicable social rules and the constraints of late sittings. Subsidies attributable to members, employees and security requirements should be disclosed separately. [1][3]
Why €12 million is not yet demonstrated
The €12 million figure must remain an estimate requiring consolidation until both chambers publish comparable accounting. Savings equal the subsidy reduction actually achieved after price adjustments minus contractual or employment-related extra costs. The Senate figure is an anchor, not a national total. [1][2][3]
Do not confuse restraint with dysfunction
Removing on-site catering altogether would be counterproductive when sittings run late or security constraints restrict movement. Reform should target unjustified subsidy and pricing transparency, not the existence of an institutional catering service itself. [1][3]
What must be demonstrated before retaining the 12 million euros per year target
Parliamentary catering should be costed as a complete service
Catering inside a parliamentary estate operates under unusual security, access and sitting-hour constraints. A meal priced below a nearby commercial restaurant does not by itself prove an unjustified subsidy. The audit needs the full service cost: food, staff, premises, equipment, energy, cleaning, security, outsourced services and receipts. Senate accounts identify catering-related spending and should be reconciled with the associated revenue. [1] [3]
The reform should then distinguish users and purposes. A service needed by staff during late sittings is different from a personal price advantage with no operational justification; a protocol meal is different from an ordinary lunch. The dashboard can publish full cost per meal and average prices paid by broad category without tracking individuals. Assembly budget data provide an institutional frame but do not, on their own, establish the catering saving. [2]
A real net gain can come from better pricing, more accurate billing, a more efficient contract or ending an unjustified contribution. Closing an on-site service only to increase expense claims or lose parliamentary working time would simply shift costs. The target should therefore be validated after a full executed year using meal volumes, revenue, fixed and variable costs and any replacement expenditure. That turns a symbolic issue into an auditable management reform.
A meal price alone does not establish an unjustified subsidy
Auditing parliamentary catering requires comparing the user price with the full cost of the service. That cost includes food, staff, energy, equipment and the constraints of operating on a secure institutional site; some expenses would remain even if catering were outsourced. The impact file should therefore identify the gap between full cost and the amount paid, then explain which part represents an individual benefit and which part reflects institutional operating requirements. Without that decomposition, a price below full cost can be labelled a subsidy even when part of the difference arises from constraints the user does not control.
Several options can then be compared: marginal-cost pricing, pricing closer to full cost, outsourcing, or an internal service with explicit treatment of security overhead. Each scenario should measure net cost and effects on sitting schedules, travel and availability. An apparent saving can disappear if members and staff must leave the site or if a contractor charges for access restrictions. The objective is therefore not a symbolically high meal price but a system in which any personal benefit is identifiable and the remaining institutional cost is transparently recognised.
Measure parliamentary catering on a full-cost basis
Parliamentary catering should be analysed as a service combining food purchases, staff, premises, energy, maintenance, depreciation and user revenue. The price paid for a meal cannot by itself show whether a public subsidy exists. The reform should reconstruct full cost by service or major activity and compare it with revenue. Working meals, protocol events and other catering activities should be distinguished because their purposes and funding models differ.
Options can then be compared: higher tariffs, removal of a subsidy, partial outsourcing, site consolidation or an internal service with a break-even target. Each creates contract, staffing and transition costs. Success is not simply a higher meal price; it is a genuine reduction in net public expenditure without compensation being recreated elsewhere. Annual publication of full cost, revenue and cost-recovery rate would make the trajectory measurable without reducing the debate to isolated menu prices.
Common audit method: double-counting controls, transition costs and budget reconciliation are centralised in the versioned budget-methodology register. For measure 1.18, those rules apply only to the flows and risks documented on this page; no saving is booked without executed baseline spending, an identifiable base and transferred costs deducted.
Open the technical appendix: evidence required before validating the costing
| Stage | Expected evidence | Timing | Treatment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zero baseline | Executed expenditure, headcount, contracts, allowances, property and directly related resources | Before legislation | Publish |
| Avoidable cost base | Lines that genuinely cease, with date and legal basis | Impact assessment | Justify |
| Transition | Mobility, compensation, redistricting, IT, contracts and transfers | Year 1 | Separate from recurring |
| Transferred costs | Expenditure taken over by another administration or tier | Years 1–2 | Deduct |
| Net result | Recurring saving on a like-for-like basis with confidence level | After 12 stable months | Audit |