Start from existing law, not a fictional legal vacuum
Since the 2014 organic reform, parliamentary office has already been incompatible with many local executive functions, including mayor, deputy mayor, and president or vice-president of an intermunicipal body, department or region. The measure therefore cannot be presented as if parliamentary/local executive cumulation were still generally permitted. [1]
Where multiple office-holding still remains
The useful reform area concerns combinations that remain possible among local offices, satellite bodies, delegated chairmanships and responsibilities outside existing incompatibility rules. Each new prohibition must precisely define covered functions, the choice period and consequences of non-compliance. [1][2][3]
Defining executive and equivalent functions
This chapter proposes a national register of executive and equivalent functions cross-checked with the national register of elected officials, followed by a statutory list of incompatibilities. The objective is availability, prevention of role conflicts and democratic clarity rather than an abstract hunt for multiple offices. [1][3]
Why €200 million is not a stand-alone saving
The €200 million figure has no demonstrated stand-alone baseline. An incompatibility may remove a cumulative allowance, but another person may simply be appointed and receive it. Net budget savings may therefore be zero even when governance improves. [1][3]
Availability of elected officials and local candidate pools
The reform should avoid depriving small communities of candidates or experience without a clear benefit. Incompatibilities focused on genuine executive functions, compliance periods and evaluation by community size are preferable to a blanket ban on every responsibility. [3]
What must be demonstrated before retaining the 200 million euros per year target
Non-cumulation should target executive responsibilities that genuinely compete for time
The 2014 organic law already bars combining a parliamentary mandate with several local executive offices. [1] The reform should therefore not repackage an existing prohibition as new policy. It should identify the local or para-public executive combinations that remain possible and decide which should become incompatible with a principal executive office. The scope needs to be written role by role — municipal, intermunicipal, departmental, regional and mandate-related bodies — so candidates know in advance which office they would have to relinquish.
The primary objective is availability and clear accountability. A mayor or other executive office-holder should be identifiable as the person responsible for a policy without accumulating roles that obscure time commitment and decision-making. The impact file should therefore measure meetings, statutory duties, delegations and travel associated with the combinations in scope. That evidence is more informative than a theoretical savings figure, especially because local allowances are already subject to statutory ceilings and clawback rules. [3]
Transition should be electoral rather than chaotic. A new incompatibility can take effect at the next renewal or allow a defined period in which an office-holder chooses which post to retain. The control system should also watch for circumvention, where the title is abandoned but practical control is retained through a delegated presidency or satellite body. Success should therefore be measured through clearer responsibility, greater availability and the absence of artificial role transfers, not simply fewer lines on a political biography.
Non-cumulation should target effective power, not titles alone
A new incompatibility rule is easy to circumvent if it looks only at formal job titles. An office-holder can relinquish a presidency while retaining a vice-presidency, delegation or practical control with similar demands on time. The register should therefore classify executive and equivalent roles across municipalities, intermunicipal bodies, departments, regions and associated public bodies using functional criteria such as signature authority, budget delegation or management responsibility. That makes similar cases subject to the same rule and reduces the need for repeated legislative patches as organisational forms change.
Evaluation should focus on availability and clear accountability. Before-and-after indicators might include the number of executive roles held, attendance at required meetings, decision delays and the clarity with which residents can identify the responsible office-holder. Financially, only allowances that actually disappear without being paid to a successor constitute savings. If the office still exists and another person must perform it, the principal benefit may be governance rather than expenditure. Saying so explicitly is more credible than forcing a budget saving onto a reform whose core purpose is decision-maker availability.
Make non-cumulation a rule about effective power
A non-cumulation rule can be bypassed if it targets titles alone. An office-holder may leave a presidency yet retain a powerful vice-presidency, executive delegation, chairmanship of a public body or decisive role in an inter-municipal structure. The reform should therefore define executive office by powers actually exercised: signature authority, budget delegation, service management, appointment powers and legal representation. The definition must be known before elections so candidates understand which combinations are incompatible and when a choice must be made.
Transition rules matter too. After an election or appointment, a short but realistic period is needed to relinquish one role, maintain continuity and trigger succession. Oversight could rely on a public register of mandates and delegated powers capable of flagging incompatibilities while minimising unnecessary personal data. Success is not the number of forced resignations; it is a measurable reduction in concentration of local executive power and clearer political accountability.
Common audit method: double-counting controls, transition costs and budget reconciliation are centralised in the versioned budget-methodology register. For measure 1.09, those rules apply only to the flows and risks documented on this page; no saving is booked without executed baseline spending, an identifiable base and transferred costs deducted.
Open the technical appendix: evidence required before validating the costing
| Stage | Expected evidence | Timing | Treatment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zero baseline | Executed expenditure, headcount, contracts, allowances, property and directly related resources | Before legislation | Publish |
| Avoidable cost base | Lines that genuinely cease, with date and legal basis | Impact assessment | Justify |
| Transition | Mobility, compensation, redistricting, IT, contracts and transfers | Year 1 | Separate from recurring |
| Transferred costs | Expenditure taken over by another administration or tier | Years 1–2 | Deduct |
| Net result | Recurring saving on a like-for-like basis with confidence level | After 12 stable months | Audit |