Measure 1.01 — Reducing the National Assembly to 125 members

A smaller Assembly would redraw political representation, not merely remove seats

Moving from 577 to 125 members would require a new representation map rather than a proportional shrinking of existing constituencies. The Constitution sets the framework and organic legislation determines the number of members; any subsequent redistricting would still have to respect equality of the vote while dealing explicitly with sparsely populated departments, overseas territories and French citizens abroad. ^[1] The reform file should therefore publish the allocation rule before publishing a savings figure: reference population, permitted deviations, treatment of special territories, constituency-building rules and an independent redistricting process. A cheaper chamber that cannot produce a legally defensible map is not an implementable reform. ^[3]

The Assembly’s 2026 budget shows why the headline total is not a savings base. Out of €644.01 million, €347 million is classified as parliamentary expenditure, €203.15 million as staff costs and €39.27 million as investment. The parliamentary staff allowance accounts for €83.80 million within secretariat and member-support spending. ^[2] Those lines do not respond equally to seat numbers: member allowances and some individual resources vary directly, while security, chamber systems, archives, part of the permanent workforce and much of the estate remain. The impact file should therefore classify each line as seat-variable, partly variable or fixed in the short run.

The final test is scrutiny capacity. With only 125 members, committees, inquiries, delegations and budget rapporteurs would have far fewer elected members available at the same time. Some of that pressure could be offset by stronger non-partisan research services, but the cost of doing so belongs in the model. The reform should publish a workload simulation covering bills, hearings, reporting duties, committee staffing and constituency work. Net savings are credible only if the resulting chamber can still challenge the executive with independent technical capacity rather than simply process legislation more quickly.

What a 125-member Assembly would change in practice

A 125-member chamber cannot simply keep the working architecture of a 577-seat Assembly in miniature. The number of members simultaneously available for standing committees, inquiry committees, delegations, fact-finding missions and budget scrutiny becomes a capacity constraint. The impact assessment should therefore model several representative parliamentary weeks: an ordinary sitting week, a budget week, scrutiny of a major bill and an intensive oversight period. For each scenario, it should show how many MPs are required at the same time, which offices would have to be combined and what additional permanent expertise might be needed. If fewer elected members require more parliamentary lawyers, analysts or pooled staff, those costs must return to the net calculation instead of being left outside the reform perimeter.

Redistricting is a second project in its own right. With only 125 seats, moving a small number of constituencies can materially alter the relative representation of territories. The public file should therefore publish alternative maps, population deviations and the treatment of overseas territories, citizens abroad and sparsely populated areas. That would allow debate to focus on a verifiable design rather than the symbolism of the number 125 alone. The final test is not merely whether the Assembly costs less, but whether it can still legislate, scrutinise, represent and investigate without silently transferring power to the executive or to unelected expert structures.

The decisive test: keep Parliament capable of doing its job

A 125-member National Assembly must be stress-tested during the periods when Parliament is most heavily loaded, not merely during an ordinary sitting week. The impact assessment should reconstruct a full budget cycle, the simultaneous scrutiny of several bills, an inquiry committee and an urgent crisis requiring hearings. Each scenario should count the functions that require an available member: committee chairs, rapporteurs, group speakers, inquiry members, delegations, scrutiny missions and constituency work. If the same member must occupy incompatible roles at the same time, the reform becomes a loss of institutional capacity. The relevant indicator is therefore not only cost per seat, but the volume of legislative scrutiny, hearings and oversight that a 125-member chamber can absorb without becoming intellectually dependent on the executive.

Redistricting should likewise be presented through public alternatives. One map could maximise population equality; another could protect a minimum territorial presence; a third could test broader constituencies or a proportional component. Publishing several options makes the trade-off visible: budget savings, proximity, pluralism and electoral equality do not all move in the same direction. Before a decision is taken, each scenario should be compared through a compact dashboard covering average population represented, dispersion between districts, net cost after any reinforcement of parliamentary expertise, and scrutiny capacity. The number 125 then becomes a constitutional and operational design to be demonstrated rather than a symbolic target.

Common audit method: double-counting controls, transition costs and budget reconciliation are centralised in the versioned budget-methodology register. For measure 1.01, those rules apply only to the flows and risks documented on this page; no saving is booked without executed baseline spending, an identifiable base and transferred costs deducted.