PUBLIC FINANCE · 155 MEASURES ·
Cross-category financial consolidation ledger
After the category-by-category audit, this pass brings all 155 measures into one register and fixes the rule that prevents double counting for each one.
New consolidation layer
What this step changes
Historical Plan ranges remain scenario traces and are not mechanically added. The ledger now separates removed expenditure, revenue, revenue cuts, investment, public-enterprise gains, contingent productivity, governance rules and restructuring. A productivity gain enters the budget only when a real position, contract or cost disappears, or when a planned hire is demonstrably avoided.
The same rule applies to oversight bodies such as HATVP: AI first splits tasks into remove, automate, assist and human-only. Documentary pre-checks, registry matching, inconsistency detection and file preparation can be automated or assisted; adversarial procedure, legal assessment, sensitive investigation, decisions and sanctions remain human. The broader public-sector approach is developed in AI: How to Transform France.
Ledger status: 155 unique measures and 422 unique deduplication relationships between measures. No global savings total is published at this stage: a defensible total requires timing, transition costs and proof that expenditure actually disappears.
Booking-rule distribution
155-measure ledger
| ID | Measure | Source effect | Financial-owner rule | Financial nature | Deduplication |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.01 | Reduce the National Assembly from 577 to 125 members, at least one per department | €432–467m per year | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Fixed and variable costs still need to be separated; the mechanical ceiling is not a net saving. | No explicit link |
| 1.02 | Reduce the Senate from 348 to 125 senators | €232–250m per year | Institutional budget: potential saving after fixed/variable cost and transition breakdown | Separate senator-linked expenditure, permanent staff, property costs and residual commitments. | No explicit link |
| 1.03 | Reduce the government to nine full ministries and abolish delegated ministers | €90–180m per year | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Separate cabinet savings, political functions, support functions and any reorganisation costs. | 1.08 |
| 1.04 | Mandatory parliamentary attendance with automatic financial penalties | €150m per year | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | The financial effect depends on future behaviour; the primary objective is attendance, not revenue generation. | No explicit link |
| 1.05 | Halve parliamentary staff allowances | €85m per year | Parliamentary budget: potential saving after harmonising the baseline and transition costs | The €85m figure can now be compared with official envelopes; the next step is to harmonise the reference year and account for termination/transition costs. | 1.01, 1.02 |
| 1.06 | Abolish the 1,758 regional councillor seats | €350m per year | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | The €350m figure cannot represent allowances alone: associated institutional costs must be itemised separately and the 1,758/1,921 perimeter must be fixed. | No explicit link |
| 1.07 | Reduce departmental councillors by 50 percent | €180m per year | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | The €180m target assumes a broader scope than allowances alone; assembly and support costs must be inventoried and overlaps removed. | No explicit link |
| 1.08 | Limit ministerial cabinets to ten members | €120m per year | State budget: potential saving after establishing the cabinet and remuneration baseline | The measure becomes directly costable once cabinet headcount and remuneration are consolidated. | 1.03 |
| 1.09 | Strict ban on holding multiple local executive mandates | €200m per year | Incompatibility rule: €0 autonomously without a distinct financial baseline | Define the operational perimeter before costing so that no saving is attributed to a prohibition already in force. | No explicit link |
| 1.10 | Cap combined allowances at 150 percent of the main mandate | €80m per year | Public allowances: potential saving only after microsimulation of overlapping allowances | Build a microsimulation of combined allowances before including €80m in a consolidated total. | 1.09, 1.19, 1.06, 1.07, 1.11 |
| 1.11 | Reduce municipal councillors by about 30 percent | €250m per year | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Reconcile the €250m estimate with municipal accounts: allowances actually paid, meeting costs, training, insurance, logistics and support functions. | No explicit link |
| 1.12 | Abolish the national Economic, Social and Environmental Council | €36m per year | CESE budget: net effect after residual costs, staff, property and transition | The live model will use the 2026 benchmark without rewriting the historical Plan figure. | No explicit link |
| 1.13 | Abolish the 13 regional economic, social and environmental councils | €75m per year | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Break the €75m estimate into allowances, staff, operating costs and shared costs. | No explicit link |
| 1.14 | Full transparency of public remuneration on a dedicated platform | Structural effect | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Cost implementation separately; any audit/control savings should be measured ex post. | No explicit link |
| 1.15 | Cap public remuneration at six times the gross minimum wage | €320m per year | Public payroll: potential saving after defining scope, caps and exceptions | Define the assessment base and responsibility-related exceptions precisely before consolidating the €320m figure. | 1.20 |
| 1.16 | End lifetime close protection for former presidents | €5m per year | Security budget: potential saving only after threat assessment and expenditure actually removed | The €5m figure remains an estimate to consolidate until recent official data are published; security arrangements should remain threat-assessment based. | No explicit link |
| 1.17 | Reduce the presidential budget and ensure full transparency | €30m per year | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Separate staff, travel, security, property, investment and transferable functions before calculating a net saving. | No explicit link |
| 1.18 | End subsidies for parliamentary restaurants and bars | €12m per year | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Publish net cost by establishment and beneficiary category before consolidating the target. | No explicit link |
| 1.19 | Remove benefits in kind not justified by security | €180m per year | Benefits in kind / expenditure: potential saving after inventory, excluding justified security | Build a scheme register before costing; justified security arrangements remain outside the removal scope. | 1.16, 1.18 |
| 1.20 | Harmonise and cap senior civil-service allowance schemes | €450m per year | Public payroll: potential saving after scope, caps and transitional rights | Define the base, target caps and transitional/acquired-right rules before consolidation. | 1.15 |
| 2.01 | Completely abolish the regional administrative tier | Detailed costing in measure file | Public budget: net effect after transfers, fixed costs and transition; no proportional rule | Restructuring | 1.06, 1.13, 2.03, 2.09, 2.10, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12 |
| 2.02 | Abolish inter-municipal structures and restore municipal sovereignty | Detailed costing in measure file | Public budget: net effect after transfers, fixed costs and transition; no proportional rule | Restructuring | 1.11, 2.03, 2.08, 2.09, 2.10 |
| 2.03 | Transition without forced redundancies, supported mobility for 128,000 staff | Investment | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Transition investment | 2.01, 2.02, 2.09, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12 |
| 2.04 | Five-year interministerial legislative clean-up mission | €8–12bn per year | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Productivity gain | 2.05, 2.06, 2.07, 2.08, 2.09, 9.01, 9.02 |
| 2.05 | Constitutionalise a one-in, two-out rule for regulations | Structural effect | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Structural rule | 2.04, 2.06 |
| 2.06 | Reduce the number of legal codes from 69 to no more than 20 | Reduce from 69 to at most 20 codes | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Structural rule | 2.04, 2.05 |
| 2.07 | Fully digitise the administration over five years | €10–15bn per year | Productivity / capacity: €0 until a real position, contract or cost disappears or is demonstrably avoided | Productivity gain | 2.04, 2.08, 2.09, 2.13, 9.01, 9.02 |
| 2.08 | Create a single departmental access point for all procedures | Structural effect | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Structural rule | 2.02, 2.07, 2.09 |
| 2.09 | Do not replace 30 to 50 percent of natural departures | Budget saving — not quantified in source table | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Payroll saving | 2.01, 2.02, 2.03, 2.07, 2.08, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 3.03, 3.04, 9.01, 9.02 |
| 2.10 | Supported internal mobility towards priority services | Structural effect | Productivity / capacity: €0 until a real position, contract or cost disappears or is demonstrably avoided | Redeployment | 2.03, 2.09, 2.11, 2.12 |
| 2.11 | Raise mutually agreed severance to one month of salary per year | Investment | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Transition investment | 2.03, 2.09, 2.10 |
| 2.12 | Progressive reduction of activity for staff aged 58 to 62 | Investment | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Transition investment | 2.03, 2.09, 2.10 |
| 2.13 | Degree-awarding AI training for 400,000 public employees | Investment | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Skills investment | 2.07, 2.09, 3.04, 9.01, 9.02 |
| 3.01 | Category A: operating-cost audit of the 552 entities retained | Detailed costing in measure files | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Audit and control | 3.02, 3.03, 3.04, 2.07, 2.09, 1.15, 1.20 |
| 3.02 | Category A: cap executive compensation | Detailed costing in measure files | Public budget: potential saving only after proof of expenditure actually removed, net of transition costs | Targeted payroll saving | 1.15, 1.20, 3.01 |
| 3.03 | Category A: interministerial pooling of support functions | Detailed costing in measure files | Public budget: potential saving only after proof of expenditure actually removed, net of transition costs | Targeted budget saving | 2.07, 2.09, 3.04, 3.05, 3.06, 3.07, 3.08, 3.09, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12 |
| 3.04 | Category A: systematic deployment of artificial intelligence | Detailed costing in measure files | Productivity / capacity: €0 until a real position, contract or cost disappears or is demonstrably avoided | Productivity gain | 2.07, 2.09, 2.13, 3.03, 3.05, 9.01, 9.02, 9.03 |
| 3.05 | Category B: merge 35 operator clusters | €2.3–4.1bn per year | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Restructuring | 2.09, 2.10, 2.11, 3.03, 3.04, 3.06 |
| 3.06 | Category C: reintegrate entities whose autonomy is not justified | Detailed costing in measure files | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Reintegration | 2.09, 2.10, 3.03, 3.04, 3.05 |
| 3.07 | Category D: abolish ADEME and fund aid directly (net amount) | Detailed costing in measure files | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Abolition / transfer | 2.01, 2.02, 2.09, 3.03, 3.04, 3.12, 7.01, 7.02 |
| 3.08 | Category D: abolish the French Biodiversity Office (net amount) | Detailed costing in measure files | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Abolition / transfer | 2.09, 3.03, 3.04, 3.12, 7.01, 7.02 |
| 3.09 | Category D: abolish AFITF (net amount) | Detailed costing in measure files | Public budget: net effect after transfers, fixed costs and transition; no proportional rule | Reinternalisation | 3.03, 3.04, 8.01, 8.02 |
| 3.10 | Category D: abolish regional health agencies (net amount) | Detailed costing in measure files | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Abolition / transfer | 2.01, 2.03, 2.09, 2.10, 3.03, 3.04, 5.01, 5.02, 5.03 |
| 3.11 | Category D: abolish regional agriculture directorates (net amount) | €60–120m per year | Public budget: net effect after transfers, fixed costs and transition; no proportional rule | Territorial restructuring | 2.01, 2.03, 2.09, 2.10, 3.03, 3.04 |
| 3.12 | Category D: rationalise DDT, DREAL and water agencies | Detailed costing in measure files | Public budget: net effect after transfers, fixed costs and transition; no proportional rule | Territorial rationalisation | 2.01, 2.02, 2.08, 2.09, 3.03, 3.04, 3.08, 7.01 |
| 3.13 | Category D: abolish 316 marginal consultative committees | €120–240m per year | Public budget: potential saving only after proof of expenditure actually removed, net of transition costs | Operating saving | 2.04, 2.05, 2.06, 3.18 |
| 3.14 | Category D: abolish the audiovisual council and regulatory overlaps | €85m per year | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Regulator reform | 3.03, 3.04, 9.01, 9.02 |
| 3.15 | Break up France Télévisions and privatise by asset | €2.6bn per year | Public broadcasting: net effect after valuing assets, liabilities, staff and public-service obligations | Public-media reform | 3.16, 10.01, 10.02 |
| 3.16 | Deep rationalisation of Radio France by 30–45 percent | €200–300m per year | Public broadcasting: net effect after fixed costs, retained missions and transition | Public-media reform | 3.15 |
| 3.17 | Abolish all public support to the press | €320m per year | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Direct aid / tax expenditure | 6.11 |
| 3.18 | Publish an exhaustive count of national public bodies in the Official Journal | Structural effect | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Transparency / registry | 3.01, 3.13 |
| 4.01 | Double justice funding over five years | Investment | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Investment | 4.08, 2.10, 2.13, 9.01 |
| 4.02 | Deploy artificial intelligence across 164 judicial courts | €1.2bn per year — productivity | Productivity / capacity: €0 until a real position, contract or cost disappears or is demonstrably avoided | Productivity gain — umbrella measure | 4.03, 4.04, 4.05, 4.07, 2.07, 2.13, 3.04, 9.01, 9.02, 9.03 |
| 4.03 | Automated pre-processing of simple cases | €800m per year — productivity | Productivity / capacity: €0 until a real position, contract or cost disappears or is demonstrably avoided | Productivity gain — subcomponent | 4.02, 4.07, 4.09, 4.10, 2.07, 2.13, 9.01 |
| 4.04 | AI-assisted case-law research | €150m per year — productivity | Productivity / capacity: €0 until a real position, contract or cost disappears or is demonstrably avoided | Productivity gain — legal research | 4.02, 4.05, 4.09, 4.10, 3.04, 9.01 |
| 4.05 | Consistency analysis of decisions by sampling | Structural effect | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Quality control | 4.02, 4.04, 4.09, 4.10 |
| 4.06 | Remove simple tax disputes from full judicial proceedings | €2–4bn per year — productivity | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Productivity gain — perimeter to split | 4.03, 4.07, 6.09, 2.07 |
| 4.07 | Reduce average civil-case processing time to six months | Structural effect | Productivity / capacity: €0 until a real position, contract or cost disappears or is demonstrably avoided | Performance target | 4.01, 4.02, 4.03, 4.04, 4.06, 4.08 |
| 4.08 | Create 5,000 net judge and court-clerk posts through redeployment | Structural effect | Productivity / capacity: €0 until a real position, contract or cost disappears or is demonstrably avoided | Redeployment / staffing | 4.01, 2.09, 2.10, 2.11, 4.02, 9.01 |
| 4.09 | Mandatory human intervention for every adverse decision | Structural effect | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Legal safeguard | 4.02, 4.03, 4.04, 4.05, 4.10, 9.01 |
| 4.10 | Full traceability of AI-assisted decisions, ten-year archiving | Structural effect | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Traceability / audit | 4.02, 4.03, 4.04, 4.05, 4.09, 9.01 |
| 5.01 | Reduce hospital administrative staffing and increase care staff | €3.5bn per year — direct budget saving, level C | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Redeployment first, then possible net saving | 2.07, 2.09, 2.10, 2.13, 3.03, 3.04, 5.02, 5.05, 9.05, 9.07 |
| 5.02 | AI-assisted end-of-shift voice report | €2.8bn per year — productivity, level C | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Productivity / time gain | 5.01, 2.07, 2.13, 3.04, 9.01, 9.03, 9.05, 9.07, 9.12 |
| 5.03 | Recovery of excessive extra fees | €1.2bn per year — new/recovered revenue, level C | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Conditional revenue | 5.08, 6.09, 10.12 |
| 5.04 | Delist appointment platforms showing waits above three months | Structural effect | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Regulation / access to care | 5.08 |
| 5.05 | Reintegrate regional health agencies into the ministry (net amount) | €180m–€350m per year — direct budget saving, level C | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Net structural saving | 3.10, 2.01, 2.09, 2.10, 3.03, 3.04, 5.01, 9.07 |
| 5.06 | Maintain certified health-data hosting | Structural effect — legal safeguard | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Security and compliance safeguard | 9.01, 9.02, 9.04, 9.10, 9.12, 9.13 |
| 5.07 | Early disease detection with artificial intelligence | Structural effect | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Clinical innovation / screening | 5.02, 5.06, 9.01, 9.02, 9.03, 9.12 |
| 5.08 | Cap sector-2 extra fees | Structural effect | Price regulation: €0 autonomous budget saving without demonstrated effect on reimbursed expenditure | Price regulation | 5.03, 5.04 |
| 6.01 | Constitutional cap on compulsory levies at 50 percent | Structural effect — Constitution | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Legal ceiling, not an automatic saving | 10.09, 10.01, 10.03 |
| 6.02 | Reduce employer social contributions on low wages | Household / employment gain — GM | Public revenue: cost to fund before any feedback effect | Tax cut requiring financing | 6.01, 9.07, 10.01, 10.03 |
| 6.03 | Protect family inheritance: €1m per child, €500k for a qualifying blended-family child, €1m per sibling | Household gain — GM | Public revenue: cost to fund before any feedback effect | Inheritance-tax reduction | 10.01, 10.03 |
| 6.04 | Exempt real-estate capital gains after ten years | Household gain — GM | Public revenue: cost to fund before any feedback effect | Real-estate tax reduction | 10.01, 10.03 |
| 6.05 | Spread development-tax payment over fifteen years | Household cash-flow gain — GM | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Cash-flow / financing cost | 6.13, 8.05 |
| 6.06 | Abolish the research tax credit for large companies | €5.5bn per year — revenue, level B | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Revenue from reducing tax expenditure | 6.07, 6.08, 6.11, 8.07, 8.08 |
| 6.07 | Reform the research tax credit for SMEs and mid-caps | €2bn per year — revenue, level C | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Tax reform requiring precise design | 6.06, 6.08, 6.11, 8.07, 8.08 |
| 6.08 | Redirect savings toward public research | Investment — IN | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Public reinvestment | 6.06, 6.07, 10.01, 10.03 |
| 6.09 | Fight tax fraud with artificial intelligence | Net revenue — level C | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Incremental revenue, not total fraud | 2.13, 9.03, 9.05, 9.06, 9.07, 9.12, 10.03 |
| 6.10 | Fight social fraud with artificial intelligence | Net revenue — level C | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Incremental recovery / loss prevention | 9.03, 9.05, 9.07, 9.12, 11.03, 11.05 |
| 6.11 | Review poorly targeted tax expenditures | Net revenue — level C | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Revenue from removing tax expenditures | 6.06, 6.07, 8.07, 8.08 |
| 6.12 | Cap profit margins on public procurement at 30 percent | €3bn–€5bn per year — direct budget saving, level C | Public budget: potential saving only after proof of expenditure actually removed, net of transition costs | Procurement saving to be measured | 8.04, 9.14, 11.10, 11.12 |
| 6.13 | Abolish development tax on new housing | Household gain — GM | Local public revenue: cost to fund before any economic feedback | Local-revenue cut / housing-cost reduction | 6.05, 8.05, 10.03 |
| 7.01 | Renegotiate the universal nuclear payment, post-ARENH mechanism | €3–5bn per year — public-enterprise gain, C | Public-enterprise account: not an automatic State-budget saving | Potential EDF gain, not an automatic budget saving | 7.02, 10.01, 10.03 |
| 7.02 | Renegotiate the European nuclear regulatory mechanism | Structural effect | Public-enterprise account: not an automatic State-budget saving | Regulatory reform requiring financial parameters | 7.01 |
| 7.03 | Repeal the 2017 law ending hydrocarbon exploration and production | Unquantified new revenue — RN | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Legal opening; contingent revenue | 7.04 |
| 7.04 | National oil and gas exploration programme | Unquantified new revenue — RN | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Investment/exploration before any potential revenue | 7.03 |
| 7.05 | Restart the ASTRID fourth-generation nuclear project | Investment — IN | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Long-term R&D and capital investment | 6.08, 9.03 |
| 7.06 | Prepare for lunar helium-3 exploitation | Structural effect | Very-long-horizon research: investment / cost before any hypothetical revenue | Very-long-horizon technology option | 7.05, 6.08 |
| 7.07 | Immediate 20-cent-per-litre cut in fuel taxes | Source cost: €6bn per year — household gain, A | Public revenue: cost to fund before any feedback effect | Purchasing-power gain financed by lost revenue | 6.01, 10.01, 10.03 |
| 7.08 | Return motorways to public control when concessions expire | €2–4bn per year — revenue, B | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Net post-concession revenue, not turnover | 7.09, 7.10 |
| 7.09 | Tax excess profits of motorway concession companies | €1.2bn per year — revenue, B | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Incremental tax revenue net of the existing tax | 7.08, 7.10 |
| 7.10 | National motorway authority after concession expiry, Italian-model reference | Structural effect | Productivity / capacity: €0 until a real position, contract or cost disappears or is demonstrably avoided | Post-concession governance choice | 7.08, 7.09 |
| 8.01 | Strengthen and enforce the “fait maison” label | Structural effect | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Consumer-information and enforcement rule; no direct budget saving | No explicit link |
| 8.02 | Reach 80% French products in public canteens by 2030 | Structural effect | Productivity / capacity: €0 until a real position, contract or cost disappears or is demonstrably avoided | Procurement target; budget effect depends on prices and procurement law | 8.04 |
| 8.03 | Liberalise citizen food self-sufficiency | Structural effect | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Regulatory reform; local economic effect, no predetermined budget saving | 8.05 |
| 8.04 | Cap margins on public procurement contracts | €3–5bn per year — direct budget saving, C | Public budget: potential saving only after proof of expenditure actually removed, net of transition costs | Same financial line as 6.12; no additional saving in consolidation | 6.12 |
| 8.05 | Reduce development tax that hinders business creation | Gain for households / businesses | Local public revenue: cost to fund before any economic feedback | Local tax cut; revenue cost before economic effects | 6.05, 6.13 |
| 8.06 | Radically simplify business procedures | Structural effect | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Time/productivity gain; budget saving only after real cost reduction | 2.04, 2.05, 2.06, 2.07, 2.08 |
| 8.07 | Remove aid to large companies without employment commitments | Source category range: €30–50bn per year — direct budget saving, C | Public budget: potential saving only after proof of expenditure actually removed, net of transition costs | Potential saving on aid actually abolished; beneficiary-level costing required | 6.02, 6.06, 6.07, 6.11, 8.08 |
| 8.08 | Apply strict conditions to industrial aid | Structural effect | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Eligibility and clawback rule; revenue only when a clause is triggered | 8.07, 6.06, 6.07, 6.11 |
| 8.09 | Ten-year service commitment in France for graduates of grandes écoles | Structural effect | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Service obligation; no automatic revenue | 8.10 |
| 8.10 | Recover public training costs from graduates who expatriate | Uncosted new revenue — revenue | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Repayment revenue only where a prior legal obligation exists and is breached | 8.09 |
| 9.01 | Five-layer sovereign architecture | Structural effect | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Umbrella architecture; no autonomous financial gain | 2.07, 3.04, 9.03, 9.08 |
| 9.02 | Exclusive hosting with SecNumCloud-qualified providers | Structural effect | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Security/sovereignty requirement; migration and hosting costs must be measured | 5.06, 9.01, 9.03, 9.04 |
| 9.03 | Public multi-model inference platform | Investment | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Investment and operating cost; measure is partly materialised by Albert API | 9.01, 9.02, 9.04, 9.08, 3.04, 4.02, 5.02 |
| 9.04 | Twelve-month contractual reversibility clause | Structural effect | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Contract safeguard; reduces lock-in risk, not a direct saving | 9.02, 9.03, 3.03 |
| 9.05 | Train 5.85 million public employees, including 2.58 million State civil servants, over five years | €3.2bn per year cost — investment, B | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Training investment; source cost must be rebuilt by population and format | 2.13, 2.07, 3.04, 4.02, 5.02, 6.09, 6.10 |
| 9.06 | Deployment at the General Directorate of Public Finances | €15–25bn per year — new/recovered revenue, C | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | DGFiP use case; consolidated tax revenue belongs to 6.09 | 6.09, 2.07, 9.03, 9.07, 9.14 |
| 9.07 | Automation of 521,000 administrative positions through natural attrition | €30–46bn per year — productivity gain, C | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Productivity potential; no budget effect without a position actually left unfilled/removed | 2.07, 2.09, 2.10, 2.13, 3.04, 4.02, 4.03, 4.04, 5.02, 6.09, 6.10, 8.06, 9.05, 9.06 |
| 9.08 | Interministerial mission attached to the Prime Minister | Investment | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Governance and steering; structural cost must be limited and deduplicated | 9.01, 9.03, 10.17 |
| 9.09 | Quarterly parliamentary oversight of deployments | Structural effect | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Democratic oversight; no direct saving | 9.10, 9.11, 10.15 |
| 9.10 | Annual public audit by the Court of Auditors | Structural effect | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Public audit; no autonomous financial gain | 9.09, 9.11, 10.14 |
| 9.11 | Quarterly indicators published in the Official Journal | Structural effect — democratic oversight | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Indicator publication; no direct saving | 9.09, 9.10, 9.13, 10.14, 10.15 |
| 9.12 | Mandatory human intervention for every adverse decision | Structural effect — legal safeguard | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Rights safeguard; may create human-review costs, not savings | 4.09, 6.09, 6.10, 11.03 |
| 9.13 | Public transparency platform | Structural effect — democratic oversight | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Transparency tool; investment/OPEX, not direct saving | 9.09, 9.10, 9.11, 1.14, 11.09, 11.10 |
| 9.14 | Preventive anomaly detection in public procurement | Structural effect — normative measure | Public revenue: only net cash actually collected or tax expenditure actually removed | Detection tool; saving/revenue only after an avoided or recovered loss | 6.12, 8.04, 11.10, 11.12, 9.07 |
| 10.01 | Constitutional budget-balance rule, German model | Structural effect — Constitution | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Framework rule; €0 autonomous saving | 10.03, 10.04, 10.06 |
| 10.02 | Referendum-backed debt brake, Swiss model | Structural effect — institutional effect | Institutional rule: €0 autonomously | Institutional rule; €0 autonomous effect | 10.01, 10.03, 10.16 |
| 10.03 | Constitutional structural-deficit ceiling of 0.35% of GDP | Structural effect — Constitution | Balance rule: €0 autonomously | Balance rule; no autonomous euro effect | 10.01, 10.02, 10.04, 10.06 |
| 10.04 | Automatic commitment freeze when the fiscal path slips | Structural effect — institutional effect | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Correction mechanism; savings belong to appropriations actually cancelled | 10.01, 10.03, 10.17 |
| 10.05 | Constitutional revision 1, reduction in Parliament | Structural effect — Constitution | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Legal vehicle for 1.01 and 1.02; €0 additional | 1.01, 1.02 |
| 10.06 | Constitutional revision 2, budget balance | Structural effect — Constitution | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Vehicle for 10.01/10.03; €0 additional | 10.01, 10.03 |
| 10.07 | Constitutional revision 3, artificial intelligence | Structural effect — Constitution | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Legal safeguard; €0 autonomous saving | 9.01, 9.12, 4.09 |
| 10.08 | Constitutional revision 4, pay transparency | Structural effect — Constitution | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Transparency safeguard; financial owners are in Category 01 | 1.14, 1.15 |
| 10.09 | Constitutional revision 5, cap on compulsory levies | Structural effect — Constitution | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Legal vehicle for 6.01; €0 additional | 6.01 |
| 10.10 | Constitutional revision 6, ministerial-cabinet cap | Structural effect — Constitution | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Vehicle for 1.08; constitutional amendment is not required for a simple cap | 1.08 |
| 10.11 | Constitutional revision 7, abolition of the CESE | Structural effect — Constitution | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Legal vehicle for 1.12; €0 additional | 1.12 |
| 10.12 | Constitutional revision 8, abolition of the regional tier | Structural effect — Constitution | Governance / rule / oversight: €0 autonomously; only implementation cost or the effect of the substantive owner measure can be booked | Legal vehicle for 2.01 and related institutional measures | 2.01, 1.06, 1.13 |
| 10.13 | Formal public mid-term review before Congress | Structural effect — institutional effect | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Accountability; marginal cost, no direct saving | 10.15, 1.14 |
| 10.14 | Permanent annual audit mandate for the Court of Auditors | Structural effect — institutional effect | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Oversight; audit cost, no automatic saving | 9.10, 10.15 |
| 10.15 | Joint bicameral parliamentary monitoring delegation | Structural effect — institutional effect | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Parliamentary oversight; marginal cost, no direct saving | 9.09, 9.11, 10.13, 10.14 |
| 10.16 | Referendum fallback scenarios | Structural effect — institutional effect | Adoption strategy: €0 autonomously | Adoption strategy; €0 autonomous effect | 10.01, 10.02, 10.03, 10.05, 10.06, 10.07, 10.08, 10.09, 10.10, 10.11, 10.12 |
| 10.17 | State-reform unit attached to the Prime Minister | Structural effect — institutional effect | Expenditure / investment: isolate the cost; never book it as an automatic saving | Delivery unit; operating cost, no autonomous saving | 9.08, 2.04, 3.03 |
| 11.01 | Cap on cash social benefits | 5 à 8 milliards d’euros par an (index source) — section détaillée : 650 M€ à 1,3 Md€/an avant compensation en nature | 11.01/11.02 reform family | Benefit-composition reform; net saving not validated | 11.02, 11.03, 11.04, 11.05, 9.07, 2.04 |
| 11.02 | Universal citizen card for in-kind benefits | Effet structurel — aides en nature | implementation cost | Investment and delivery shift; no autonomous saving | 11.01, 11.03, 9.01, 9.03, 9.12, 2.04 |
| 11.03 | Real-time monitoring of beneficiaries | Effet structurel — suivi des droits | 11.05 for benefit-fraud recovery; 9.07 for workforce effect | Management tool; €0 autonomous effect | 11.01, 11.02, 11.05, 6.10, 9.07 |
| 11.04 | Conditional social rights for non-EU nationals | Chiffrage détaillé en fiche — historique 6 à 8 Md€/an dans la section détaillée | 11.04 only after benefit-by-benefit legal validation | Benefit-by-benefit legal reform; historical estimate frozen | 11.01, 11.02, 11.05 |
| 11.05 | Combating social-benefit fraud | Chiffrage détaillé en fiche — recettes/indus à distinguer | single 6.10/11.05 fraud ledger | Overpayments prevented/recovered; not gross detected amount | 6.10, 9.06, 9.07, 11.03, 11.01 |
| 11.06 | Reform of public funding for trade unions | 1,2 milliard d’euros par an | 11.06 excluding 11.07/11.08 | Spending to decompose; €1.2bn cannot be equated with the mutual fund alone | 11.07, 11.08, 6.11 |
| 11.07 | Abolition of the trade-union tax credit for individuals | 144 millions d’euros par an | 11.07 | Potential tax revenue; current tax-expenditure cost must be refreshed | 11.06, 6.11 |
| 11.08 | Reduction of union release time across the three civil services | 800 millions d’euros par an | 11.08 only for net payroll/capacity effect | Public staff time; saving only if capacity is actually removed/redeployed | 11.06, 2.04, 2.07, 9.07 |
| 11.09 | Full publication of public remuneration | Effet structurel — transparence | governance only | Transparency; €0 autonomous effect | 10.08, 3.02, 1.08, 9.13 |
| 11.10 | Automatic publication of public contracts above €25,000 | Effet structurel — transparence de la commande publique | governance/open data | Extension of an existing regime; €0 direct | 11.12, 9.14, 9.13, 6.12, 8.04 |
| 11.11 | Publication of interest declarations for senior civil servants | Effet structurel — déclarations d’intérêts | governance only | Transparency expansion; €0 direct | 11.13, 11.14, 9.13, 10.08 |
| 11.12 | Preventive control of suspicious public contracts | Effet structurel — contrôle préventif | single procurement integrity ledger | Control measure; saving only when expenditure is actually prevented | 9.14, 11.10, 6.12, 8.04 |
| 11.13 | Stronger criminal penalties for undeclared conflicts of interest | Effet structurel — sanctions | legal safeguard | Legal sanction; €0 autonomous effect | 11.11, 11.14 |
| 11.14 | Stronger budgetary independence for the HATVP | Effet structurel — contrôle démocratique | implementation/oversight cost | AI-assisted institutional strengthening; net cost to measure | 10.14, 11.11, 11.13, 9.03, 9.07, 9.12, 9.13 |
| 12.01 | Closure of remaining special pension schemes | Effet structurel | structural closure | Legal closure; mainly long-term budget effect | 12.02, 12.03, 12.04 |
| 12.02 | Gradual convergence of parameters over ten years | 400 à 800 millions d’euros par an | public pension budget | Potential budget saving; financial owner of the pension block | 12.01, 12.03, 12.04 |
| 12.03 | Full transparency on the cost of each special scheme | Effet structurel | transparency | Transparency; €0 autonomous effect | 12.01, 12.02, 9.13, 10.14, 11.09 |
| 12.04 | Constitutional ban on creating new special schemes | Effet structurel | constitutional safeguard | Constitutional safeguard; €0 autonomous effect | 12.01, 12.02, 10.06, 10.09 |
| 12.05 | Volume cap on the energy-sector employee tariff | 250 à 350 millions d’euros par an | IEG/EDF operating account | Public-enterprise / IEG gain; not a direct budget saving | 12.06, 12.07, 12.08, 7.01 |
| 12.06 | Exclusion of secondary homes from the preferential tariff | 40 à 70 millions d’euros par an | IEG/EDF operating account | IEG enterprise gain; base to be documented | 12.05, 12.08 |
| 12.07 | Restoration of standard subscription charges and taxes | 60 à 90 millions d’euros par an | split: IEG enterprise + public revenue | Mixed revenue: supplier + taxation; must be split | 12.05, 12.08 |
| 12.08 | Ten-year convergence for retirees and beneficiaries | 150 à 250 millions d’euros par an | IEG/EDF operating account | Tariff convergence; strong interaction with 12.05–12.07 | 12.05, 12.06, 12.07 |
Next layer: accounting ownership and timing
now assigns every measure to an accounting subsector, a model-entry gate and a timing rule, without falsely certifying historical ranges. Open the 155-measure matrix.
Next documentary layer
The baselines, years and primary sources register now complements this deduplication layer by pinning the documentary baseline and reference year before a unique fiscal flow is assigned.
Method rule
The ledger is a consolidation layer above the twelve category audits. It does not replace primary sources or detailed measure files. A constitutional wrapper, transparency rule, oversight mechanism or AI architecture never receives the saving of a substantive measure it secures. Likewise, detected revenue is not cash collected, and a public-enterprise gain is not automatically a State-budget saving.
— monetary pass over the 58 references
— Budgetability filter
The second pass now keeps €54.950–81.950bn of productivity gains outside the future budget total until a real cost disappears, and isolates the major business-aid, tax-control-revenue and social-support envelopes before any addition.