CONSTITUTION · BUDGET · ACCOUNTABILITY

Presidential budget accountability under Articles 67 and 68

Accountability must target deliberate obstruction or a defined offence, never merely an unsuccessful budget.

Presidential budget accountability under Articles 67 and 68
Presidential budget accountability under Articles 67 and 68
Document status : Citizen working prototype requiring expert review: these drafts are not opinions of the Conseil d’État, the Constitutional Council or any public institution.

Article 67

The President enjoys strong constitutional protection for acts performed in that capacity and from domestic proceedings during the term, subject to the Constitution’s exceptions.

Article 68

Removal is possible only for a breach of duties manifestly incompatible with holding office. studies whether deliberate refusal to comply with a final constitutional budget ruling should be expressly connected to that standard.

What should not be criminal

Good-faith forecasting errors, lawful policy choices and unexpected recessions must not become crimes.

What could be a separate offence

Knowing falsification, deliberate concealment of legally required information, destruction of records or intentional circumvention of a final ruling could be separately defined.

Working documents and data

Legal and institutional sources

French Constitution, Article 34

Article 26

Article 47

Article 47-2

Article 61

Articles 67 and 68

Article 68-1

Article 89

French fiscal council — official missions

Organic Budget Act, Article 61

Financial Courts Code, L.131-2

Criminal Code, Article 131-21

Swiss debt brake

German Basic Law, Articles 109 and 115