CONSTITUTION · BUDGET · ACCOUNTABILITY

War, pandemic, disaster, recession: escape clauses without permanent deficit

A credible escape clause must be flexible enough for a real crisis and strict enough not to become the norm.

War, pandemic, disaster, recession: escape clauses without permanent deficit
War, pandemic, disaster, recession: escape clauses without permanent deficit
Document status : Citizen working prototype requiring expert review: these drafts are not opinions of the Conseil d’État, the Constitutional Council or any public institution.

Published Plan

The source Plan uses a deliberately narrow exception framework, mainly war and sufficiently large natural disasters, with deficit caps and a required return to balance.

Why test recession and pandemic clauses

Swiss and German systems include cyclical or exceptional-event flexibility. therefore compares a strict source scenario with carefully bounded severe-recession or pandemic options before any final amendment is proposed.

Six safeguards

Defined trigger, qualified activation, capped amount, automatic expiry, separate accounting and mandatory amortization.

Correction account

Ex-post overruns would be carried into a correction account so that a change of government cannot erase the obligation to compensate them.

Working documents and data

Legal and institutional sources

French Constitution, Article 34

Article 26

Article 47

Article 47-2

Article 61

Articles 67 and 68

Article 68-1

Article 89

French fiscal council — official missions

Organic Budget Act, Article 61

Financial Courts Code, L.131-2

Criminal Code, Article 131-21

Swiss debt brake

German Basic Law, Articles 109 and 115