CRIMINAL-LAW PROTOTYPE · CULPABLE WASTE · PUBLIC MONEY

Towards an offence of culpable waste of public money?

Turning political demands for accountability into a narrow, provable offence compatible with legality and due process.

Towards an offence of culpable waste of public money?
Towards an offence of culpable waste of public money?

Where does this proposal come from?

Later scenario This offence does not appear as such in the source list of 155 measures. It comes from a later workstream on public-spending accountability. The site therefore preserves it as an extension for expert review, without rewriting the published Plan.

The wrong offence: “having wasted money”

A generic offence saying that any official who “wastes public money” is criminally liable would be too vague. It would turn political hindsight into criminal law and could paralyse legitimate public decision-making.

A more robust prototype

The offence should require objective elements: a precise legal duty, formal warning, identifiable personal decision, intentional violation or exceptionally serious fault, material expenditure/loss, no valid exception, and auditable evidence.

Concealment

Intentionally hiding a major overrun, liability or decisive information.

Deliberate breach

Knowingly circumventing a correction rule or fiscal prohibition.

Destroying records

Removing documents necessary for oversight.

Conflict of interest

Deciding despite a prohibited personal interest.

Ignored warning

Continuing a manifestly unlawful operation after concordant official warnings.

Enrichment

Full restitution in addition to penalties where personal enrichment is proved.

Legality is non-negotiable

French constitutional rights require a pre-existing and sufficiently precise criminal law. Any final text therefore needs article-by-article review by criminal lawyers, constitutional specialists, financial judges and public-procurement practitioners before inclusion in the book.

Legal and institutional sources

French Constitution, Article 20 — Government role.

Article 24 and Article 47 — Parliament and finance bills.

Article 26 — parliamentary non-liability for opinions and votes.

Article 67 and Article 68-1 — President and Government criminal regimes.

Financial Courts Code L.131-2, L.131-9 and sanctions L.131-16 et seq.

HCFP official missions; Swiss debt brake; German Basic Law Article 115.

Return to the project’s core framework

This page is part of the package on constitutional fiscal rules and accountability of public decision-makers.

Open the core architecture →