Deficit exceptions: war, disaster, recession… how do we stop the exception becoming the rule?
Escape clauses, caps, duration, enhanced majority, compensation account and mandatory return to balance.
The source text is deliberately strict
The published Plan mainly allows declared war and a natural disaster above a quantified damage threshold, with a deficit capped at 2% of GDP, limited to two consecutive years and a programmed return to balance.
adds a robustness test
Decision required The 2020 pandemic and the Swiss and German mechanisms show that a durable rule must consider crises that do not fit neatly into war or natural disaster. Three options are therefore tested: retain the source list; add severe recession and pandemic with quantitative criteria; or use a general emergency clause requiring an enhanced parliamentary majority.
Five safeguards for every exception
An exception should never allow new permanent spending without permanent funding. Exceptional expenditure should be tracked separately so that repayment remains visible.
Legal and institutional sources
French Constitution, Article 20 — Government role.
Article 24 and Article 47 — Parliament and finance bills.
Article 26 — parliamentary non-liability for opinions and votes.
Article 67 and Article 68-1 — President and Government criminal regimes.
Financial Courts Code L.131-2, L.131-9 and sanctions L.131-16 et seq.
HCFP official missions; Swiss debt brake; German Basic Law Article 115.
Return to the project’s core framework
This page is part of the package on constitutional fiscal rules and accountability of public decision-makers.