Banning deficit budgets: how can a workable constitutional rule be written?

The rule already contained in the Plan de Rupture

Source The public edition proposes that the State, local authorities and social security may not adopt an unbalanced budget except within explicitly limited exceptions, with a mandatory return to balance. It also makes a non-compliant finance bill inadmissible.

This is not a later add-on: it is already Section 25 of the public dossier.

Nominal or structural deficit?

The metric matters: mechanically banning every nominal deficit can worsen a recession, while a structural rule primarily targets permanent spending financed by debt.

A rule matters only if it can actually stop a bill

The HCFP already assesses forecast realism and trajectories, but its opinions are not binding today. The Plan scenario gives it a suspensive veto before filing. Organic legislation would need to define data access, deadlines, methodology and correction.

What should be re-examined before the next book edition

For expert review The source Plan names declared war and certain natural disasters. Comparative work suggests that a robust framework should also test severe recession, pandemics or other national emergencies, without creating an exception so broad that it destroys the rule.

Switzerland uses a cyclical mechanism. Germany retains the nominal 0.35% federal cap, but Article 115 was amended in 2025 to treat some defence and security spending above a threshold separately. The site now records that update.

Legal and institutional sources

French Constitution, Article 20 — Government role.

Article 24 and Article 47 — Parliament and finance bills.

Article 26 — parliamentary non-liability for opinions and votes.

Article 67 and Article 68-1 — President and Government criminal regimes.

Financial Courts Code L.131-2, L.131-9 and sanctions L.131-16 et seq.

HCFP official missions; Swiss debt brake; German Basic Law Article 115.