PUBLIC FINANCE · CATEGORY 07 ·

Energy: financial audit of 10 measures

The source costing is preserved, but flows are now separated: public budget, public enterprise, households and investment are no longer added as if they had the same deficit effect.

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Energy: financial audit of 10 measures | Delta-Sierra — Financial audit — category 07

Main lock: four separate accounts

State / general government

Taxes, revenue, expenditure and genuinely budgetary investment.

Public enterprises

The 7.01 gain belongs first to EDF’s account. It becomes public revenue only through an explicit channel.

Households / businesses

The fuel-tax cut raises purchasing power but first reduces public revenue.

Strategic investment

ASTRID, exploration and lunar resources are treated as investment/long-term options.

Why the historic €0.2–4.2bn range is not a State-budget total

It can be reconstructed arithmetically as €3–5bn EDF gain + €2–4bn motorway revenue + €1.2bn motorway tax − €6bn fuel-tax cut. This helps document the source Plan, but mixes public-enterprise gains, public revenue and household gains. therefore preserves the historical trace while reclassifying every flow.

Current controls add two strong bounds: the 2026 VNU rebate is €0/MWh; and a uniform €0.20/l cut applied to the 47.428 billion annual-moving litres observed around August 2025 gives a gross mechanical screen of about €9.49bn, before the exact tax scope is defined.

Motorways: separate the 2026–2030 transition from post-concession years

The seven main historic concessions expire between 2031 and 2036. Public-operation revenue therefore does not enter the baseline before expiry. Measure 7.09 counts only revenue incremental to the existing tax and fades with the relevant private tax base. Measure 7.10 is the governance architecture of 7.08, not a second revenue source.

Line-by-line audit

Measure	Source proposal	Financial nature	Current reference	Consolidation rule	Simulator treatment	Deduplication
7.01	Renegotiate the universal nuclear payment, post-ARENH mechanism €3–5bn per year — public-enterprise gain, C	Potential EDF gain, not an automatic budget saving	ARENH ended on 31 December 2025 and the VNU applies from 2026. CRE estimated EDF’s 2026 nuclear revenue at €23.7bn (€65.86/MWh), while the 2026 VNU rebate was set at €0/MWh.	The source €3–5bn scenario is preserved, but it can reduce the public deficit only through an explicit channel: dividends, tax, transfer or lower support needs. EDF must also finance maintenance, fuel, grid and investment.	Separate EDF account: nuclear-revenue change → costs → profit/cash flow → possible dividends/taxes. Consumer account kept separate.	7.02, 10.01, 10.03
7.02	Renegotiate the European nuclear regulatory mechanism Structural effect	Regulatory reform requiring financial parameters	France’s post-ARENH framework now rests on the VNU, with thresholds and a rebate defined by the applicable statutory and regulatory framework.	No amount is added until renegotiation is translated into concrete parameters: thresholds, base, beneficiaries, interaction with the European market, and effects on EDF and consumers.	€0 by default; impacts captured through 7.01 once precise legal parameters are defined.	7.01
7.03	Repeal the 2017 law ending hydrocarbon exploration and production Unquantified new revenue — RN	Legal opening; contingent revenue	The ministry states that French oil production represents about 1% of consumption and recalls the progressive phase-out framework stemming from the 2017 law.	Repealing a ban creates no revenue by itself. Revenue arises only after permits, a commercially exploitable discovery, investment, production and taxes/royalties actually collected.	€0 in the baseline; revenue only from documented production, net of public costs.	7.04
7.04	National oil and gas exploration programme Unquantified new revenue — RN	Investment/exploration before any potential revenue	Current domestic production remains marginal relative to consumption. An exploration programme therefore begins with geological, technical, administrative and environmental costs.	Separate exploration cost, private/public financing, discovery probability, development lead time, royalties and taxation. No hypothetical field enters the fiscal balance.	Negative short-term investment if publicly funded; later revenue only after production begins.	7.03
7.05	Restart the ASTRID fourth-generation nuclear project Investment — IN	Long-term R&D and capital investment	CEA states that ASTRID ran from 2010 to 2019 and ended after the demonstrator was deferred. Work on fast reactors and the programme’s knowledge base continues in other forms.	A restart is first a multi-year R&D, engineering, safety and capital programme. No future industrial benefit is counted as fiscal revenue before a documented business case exists.	Explicit investment cost; €0 automatic revenue/saving over five years.	6.08, 9.03
7.06	Prepare for lunar helium-3 exploitation Structural effect	Very-long-horizon technology option	In May 2026, NASA awarded $6.9m to Interlune to develop and validate lunar-resource prospecting technologies including helium-3. This confirms a real R&D topic, not near-term exploitable revenue.	Treat as research/strategic option. No helium-3 revenue enters the five-year budget until prospecting, extraction, transport, industrial demand and fusion economics are established.	€0 positive fiscal effect; any R&D cost isolated.	7.05, 6.08
7.07	Immediate 20-cent-per-litre cut in fuel taxes Source cost: €6bn per year — household gain, A	Purchasing-power gain financed by lost revenue	The ministry petroleum-market document reports an annual-moving road-fuel volume of 47.428 billion litres around August 2025. A uniform €0.20/l cut on every litre gives a gross mechanical screen of about €9.49bn per year. Road-fuel demand was still down 3.4% year on year in Q1 2026.	The Plan’s historic €6bn cost remains the source value. A current estimate must specify eligible litres, professional refunds, excise/VAT interaction and behavioural response. No cut is debt financed.	Gross revenue loss + VAT/volume effect − any economic feedback; funding required before activation.	6.01, 10.01, 10.03
7.08	Return motorways to public control when concessions expire €2–4bn per year — revenue, B	Net post-concession revenue, not turnover	The seven main concessions, covering more than 90% of the concession network, expire between 2031 and 2036. In 2024, concession companies generated €12.8bn revenue and €4.3bn net profit. ART also identifies end-of-contract obligations: about €1.2bn extra maintenance and €0.4–5.1bn of investments to be clarified.	No 7.08 revenue before contractual expiry in the baseline. After handback: toll/other revenue − operations − maintenance − investment − financing. Current private net profit is only a sector-scale bound, not guaranteed public revenue.	Activation from 2031 at the earliest; net post-concession scenario. Deduplicated against 7.09 and 7.10.	7.09, 7.10
7.09	Tax excess profits of motorway concession companies €1.2bn per year — revenue, B	Incremental tax revenue net of the existing tax	A long-distance transport-infrastructure operating tax already exists: it applies above €120m of revenue when average profitability exceeds 10%, at 4.6% of revenue above the threshold.	The Plan’s €1.2bn cannot simply be added to current receipts without defining the new base and rate and subtracting existing tax revenue. As concessions expire, the private taxable base shrinks or disappears depending on 7.08/7.10.	Incremental revenue only: reformed tax − existing tax; gradual phase-out with the relevant concessions.	7.08, 7.10
7.10	National motorway authority after concession expiry, Italian-model reference Structural effect	Post-concession governance choice	ART explicitly calls for decisions before 2031 on future management arrangements: operating model, perimeter, investment, financing and any future contract duration.	7.10 does not create an independent amount: it is the institutional architecture for 7.08. The “Italian model” wording is preserved as the source label; any operational comparison must identify the exact operator, legal framework and comparable performance.	€0 standalone; costs and revenue included in the 7.08 post-concession scenario.	7.08, 7.09

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