For criminal and patrimonial liability of the President and ministers in cases of serious harm to the fundamental interests of the Nation
Doctrinal proposal accompanied by a constitutional and legislative architecture submitted for expert review
French democracy rests on a contradiction that is becoming difficult to defend. Citizens answer for their conduct, taxpayers for their declarations, company directors for offences or faults attributable to them, and public managers may be sanctioned for certain serious breaches engaging their financial responsibility. Yet when a decision taken at the summit of the State leads to the loss of strategic technology, the transfer of irreplaceable know-how, the disappearance of an essential industrial capacity or the creation of lasting dependence on a foreign power, establishing the personal responsibility of decision-makers becomes extraordinarily difficult.
The damage may nevertheless be immense. A factory closes, a patent changes control, engineers leave, a production chain disappears and France may spend years rebuilding a capacity it allowed to leave its territory. When the time comes to determine who possessed the information, who was warned, who expressed reservations, who signed and who chose not to protect the asset, responsibility dissolves among the Presidency, the Prime Minister’s office, several ministries, central administrations, supervisory authorities and ministerial staffs whose members have long since moved on.
This does not mean that every failed industrial policy should become a criminal offence. Governing requires decisions under uncertainty. A transaction may appear acceptable when authorized and prove disastrous years later. A foreign company may break its promises, a technology may acquire unforeseen importance, an international crisis may alter power relations and an economic forecast may be contradicted by events.
Justice must therefore never convict a leader simply because history judges a policy to have been bad. It must, however, be able to investigate when precise evidence suggests that failure resulted not merely from an error of judgment, but from concealment, a conflict of interest, corruption, falsification, the deliberate breach of a protective duty or a decision taken with knowledge of a serious and directly foreseeable risk to the country’s fundamental interests.
The principle defended here is simple: the office must be protected so that the State can act, but it must not permanently shield the individual from all responsibility. Liability must not be driven by popular anger or political reprisal. It must arise from a law enacted before the facts, verifiable evidence, adversarial proceedings and a decision by an independent court.
Protecting the presidential mandate without creating permanent absolution
A first confusion must be dispelled. Article 16 of the Constitution does not define presidential immunity. It organizes exceptional powers that may be exercised when the institutions of the Republic, national independence, territorial integrity or the performance of international commitments are seriously and immediately threatened, while the regular functioning of constitutional public authorities is interrupted. Even then, the President is not legally authorized to do anything whatsoever: the measures must seek to restore normal institutional functioning and their continuation may be reviewed by the Constitutional Council.
The President’s responsibility is governed principally by Articles 67 and 68. Article 67 provides two distinct protections. The first is non-liability for acts performed in the capacity of President, subject to the International Criminal Court and the impeachment procedure. The second is temporary procedural inviolability: during the term of office, the President cannot be required to testify or be the subject of proceedings, investigation or prosecution before a French court. Limitation periods are suspended, and proceedings barred during the mandate may resume one month after office ends.
That resumption does not mean that a former President automatically becomes answerable for every act performed at the Élysée. The non-liability attached to properly presidential acts is currently a substantive protection, not merely a postponement of prosecution. The Constitutional Council has also clarified that the High Court under Article 68 is not a criminal court trying the President for offences committed in office; it is a parliamentary assembly empowered to remove the President for a breach manifestly incompatible with the exercise of the mandate.
Strong procedural protection during the mandate is legitimate. A head of State could not carry out the office if every diplomatic, military, economic or industrial decision immediately generated hundreds of complaints, summonses or coercive measures intended to paralyze action. Continuity of the State therefore requires robust inviolability while the office is held.
But functional protection should not become permanent immunity for offences committed in the exercise of the Presidency. One month after leaving office, a former President should be able to answer for crimes and offences personally attributable to him, including those arising from presidential acts, provided the conduct occurred after the reform entered into force, was precisely defined as an offence when committed and an independent commission first authorized prosecution or any coercive measure directed against him.
For acts performed as President, the reform must be exclusively prospective. The principle of legality requires the constituent elements of an offence and the applicable penalties to be defined by law. The separate principle of non-retroactivity requires that only conduct already criminal when committed may be punished and only by penalties then applicable.
This caution may frustrate those wishing to examine past decisions. It is nevertheless indispensable to the reform’s credibility. A text designed retrospectively to reach a particular President would immediately be denounced as a law of circumstance. A rule applying to all future Presidents establishes a general principle: no one should enter the Élysée knowing that offences committed in office will be permanently insulated from justice.
Subjecting ministers to ordinary courts
The situation of ministers differs. Article 68-1 already provides that members of the Government are criminally responsible for acts performed in office when those acts were crimes or offences at the time. They are, however, tried by the Court of Justice of the Republic.
That regime fuels the suspicion of a special justice reserved for political leaders. The problem is not necessarily the individual seriousness of its members, but its composition and its very existence: ministers do not appear before the courts normally competent to judge other citizens.
The Court of Justice of the Republic should therefore be abolished. Ministers should answer before ordinary criminal courts, with sufficient specialization to handle complex cases combining criminal law, public finance, defence secrecy, administrative decisions and industrial policy. A preliminary filter would remain necessary for acts performed in ministerial office, so that mere disagreement with public policy could not automatically trigger indictment or searches.
Acts committed before appointment or wholly unrelated to ministerial duties would continue to fall under ordinary law without prior authorization. The Constitution need not create a special regime for a private or pre-mandate offence.
This reform would above all make it possible to reconstruct the entire decision chain. A strategic disposal or technology transfer rarely results from one person’s will. It may have been prepared by an administration, negotiated by a ministerial staff, authorized by the Economy Minister, reviewed by a sectoral ministry, arbitrated by the Prime Minister and politically supported by the Presidency.
Justice should determine each person’s exact role without artificially concentrating all responsibility on the President or dissolving it in collective government action. The person who loyally transmitted an alert, the one who merely executed a lawful instruction, the one who negotiated safeguards, the final decision-maker and the person who may have concealed decisive information must not be treated identically.
The fundamental interests of the Nation already include scientific and economic potential
French law does not reduce the fundamental interests of the Nation to military defence and territorial integrity. Article 410-1 of the Criminal Code includes national independence, security, means of defence and diplomacy, but also the essential elements of scientific and economic potential, particularly agricultural potential, and cultural heritage.
A company controlling an irreplaceable process, nuclear technology, a space component, a cybersecurity capability, defence software, an energy patent or an indispensable supply chain may therefore concern a legally protected interest.
France also has a prior authorization regime for foreign investment in sensitive sectors. Article L. 151-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code subjects certain investments to authorization by the Economy Minister where activities participate in public authority or may affect public order, public security or national defence interests. Authorization may be made conditional on safeguards.
The proposal should not create a parallel system ignoring existing mechanisms. It should complement and strengthen Articles L. 151-3 and following, together with sector-specific arrangements for defence, energy, telecommunications and essential infrastructure.
What is missing is not all control, but a personal, written and traceable obligation imposed on those making the decision, and the possibility of engaging liability where clearly defined duties were deliberately circumvented.
It would violate legality to create offences as vague as “France’s decline”, “mismanagement of the Nation” or “sacrificing French interests”. Such phrases have political force but do not precisely identify prohibited conduct. Parliament must define crimes and offences clearly enough that the judge does not invent the offence after the event.
The reform must begin by creating objective duties. Before any decision concerning a strategic asset, the competent authority should be required to identify the ultimate beneficiary, obtain technical and security assessments, transmit existing warnings, disclose conflicts of interest, verify proposed safeguards and explain in writing any decision departing from convergent adverse advice.
Only after these precise duties exist can their deliberate violation be punished.
Classifying strategic assets without creating secret criminal law
A national register of strategic assets would identify companies, technologies, infrastructure, patents, software, data, supply chains and know-how whose loss of control could seriously harm the country’s fundamental interests.
Part of the register would necessarily remain confidential. Publishing a complete list of national vulnerabilities or sensitive military technologies would create new risks. But confidentiality must not produce a secret criminal duty.
Classification should result from a formal, reasoned administrative decision notified to authorities empowered to authorize, prohibit or condition the transaction. Criminal liability should require proof that the decision-maker personally knew of the classification when deciding.
Classification could not be immune from challenge. The company or person directly affected should be able to contest it before the administrative court. If the legality of classification determines a criminal case, the criminal court already has power under Article 111-5 of the Criminal Code to interpret the administrative act and assess its legality.
Classification should be time-limited. An initial five-year period, renewable after adversarial re-examination, would prevent technologies that have become ordinary from remaining indefinitely under an exceptional regime. The administration could declassify an asset when risks disappear, or renew and strengthen protection when its strategic importance increases.
The register would never itself define the offence. It would establish only that an asset was subject to reinforced protection. Prosecution would still require proof of decision-making competence, a breached duty, a detailed warning, personal knowledge and deliberate conduct.
What justice would actually have to prove
The occurrence of damage cannot be enough. A company closing after sale or a technology moving under foreign control does not automatically prove that the minister authorizing the operation committed an offence.
Justice must first identify the official’s exact competence. The verb “facilitate” is too broad for a principal offence, because an official may prepare a file or organize a meeting without power to authorize or prevent the operation. Principal liability should target the person legally empowered to decide, together with anyone who deliberately falsified, altered, removed or concealed decisive information to obtain authorization. Other participation would be handled under ordinary rules of complicity.
It must then be shown that the asset was lawfully classified and that the decision-maker knew it. A written and detailed warning must have identified a serious and directly foreseeable risk. A general claim that a transaction was “contrary to sovereignty” would not suffice. The warning should specify the threatened technology, the dependence likely to result, available alternatives and concrete consequences of losing control.
Justice should also establish a deliberate breach of a duty imposed by law or regulation. It would not be enough to prove that another decision might have been wiser. The prosecution should demonstrate, for example, that the decision-maker knowingly ignored a mandatory assessment, concealed a conflict of interest, suppressed an alert, falsified a guarantee, decided before the required opinion was delivered or deliberately departed from convergent warnings without the written reasons required by law.
Finally, a causal connection must be shown between the breach and the decision. If the transaction would lawfully have been authorized even after all information was transmitted and all procedures respected, criminal liability cannot be based solely on a later adverse result.
This demanding proof protects public action. It separates a punishable act from an error, an unpopular decision or an unforeseen failure.
A procedural filter that enables investigation instead of preventing it
A filter is necessary to protect executive action against abusive or politically motivated proceedings. But it must not become an opaque barrier making investigation impossible.
An independent Judicial Commission for Applications concerning the Exercise of Executive Power could authorize proceedings and coercive measures. It should consist only of judges and independent qualified persons, not sitting parliamentarians judging former colleagues. Members would serve a single non-renewable term and be subject to strict incompatibility and conflict-of-interest rules.
The Commission could be seized by the Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation, an investigating court, a group of parliamentarians or a qualified association acting in defence of fundamental national interests. The application would have to identify the facts, the decision, the alleged role, the proposed offence and the evidence already available.
Before authorization, prosecutors should be able to preserve evidence, gather public documents and interview voluntary witnesses. They could not yet initiate proceedings or direct coercive measures against the protected person. This distinction is essential: a filter must prevent harassment, not allow evidence to disappear while everyone waits.
Authorization would be granted when precise and concordant evidence makes an offence plausible and the requested measures appear necessary and proportionate. The Commission would not determine guilt or finally assess the evidence.
Its reasoned decision should be issued within six months and be appealable before a special chamber of the Court of Cassation. Refusal would not bar a new application based on new evidence.
After authorization, ordinary specialized courts would investigate and try the case. The judges who sat on the Commission could not participate later in the investigation, prosecution or judgment.
Preserving evidence without ignoring existing archival law
No liability system can work if the evidence disappears. Strategic decisions generate ministerial notes, emails, messages, classified assessments, minutes, telephone records, digital files and exchanges between administrations and private actors.
French law already protects public archives, including presidential and ministerial archives. Protocols may govern access and consultation, and defence secrecy has its own regime. The reform must not pretend that nothing exists. It should strengthen preservation duties and ensure that no private agreement or internal instruction allows destruction of documents relevant to criminal proceedings.
Documents concerning strategic assets should be retained for at least thirty years, with longer periods where necessary. The duty should cover professional email, messaging systems, official telephones, interministerial platforms and any private device used to exercise public functions.
An independent judge should be able to issue an early preservation order when there are serious reasons to fear disappearance, alteration or destruction. The order would freeze identified data without yet authorizing access to content protected by immunity or secrecy. Access would then follow the applicable judicial and classified-information procedures.
Destroying, altering or concealing a document covered by such an order should constitute an aggravated obstruction of justice.
Allowing institutional searches without denying defence secrecy
Searches at the Presidency, the Prime Minister’s office or ministries are especially sensitive. They involve separation of powers, continuity of State, confidential diplomatic exchanges, defence secrecy and data unrelated to the alleged offence.
But sensitivity cannot mean absolute immunity for premises. If no search is ever possible, personal liability becomes theoretical.
Such operations should be authorized by a collegiate panel of judges and precisely delimit the offences, periods, offices and data sought. They should be conducted in the presence of a senior representative of the institution and, where necessary, the authority responsible for classified information.
Classified material would be handled under Article 56-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and related procedures. A filtering judge could separate documents relevant to the investigation from those manifestly unrelated or covered by protected institutional functions.
During the presidential mandate, searches could not be used to circumvent the President’s inviolability. They might preserve institutional evidence or concern other persons, but could not amount to coercive proceedings against the sitting President.
After the mandate and Commission authorization, ordinary safeguards would apply.
Creating patrimonial risk without political confiscation
Personal responsibility has little force if the only consequence is symbolic. A convicted official should face the penalties attached to the offence, disqualification from office where justified and confiscation of the direct or indirect proceeds of wrongdoing.
But confiscation cannot become political expropriation. The Constitution protects property, legality and proportionality. It would be unjust and legally fragile to seize an entire patrimony merely because a public decision caused a large national loss.
Confiscation should therefore target the object and proceeds of the offence, or their value where they cannot be seized. Unrelated assets could be confiscated only where personal enrichment or the criminal origin of property is established under ordinary law.
The State could also seek compensation as a civil party for direct, certain and demonstrable expenditure caused by the offence: rebuilding a capability, emergency procurement, securing an infrastructure, recovering data, replacing a strategic supplier or other documented costs.
Hypothetical macroeconomic losses, uncertain future revenues or general valuations of lost sovereignty should be excluded. They are too speculative for an enforceable civil award.
The amount of compensation should reflect causation, seriousness of fault, the defendant’s personal participation and the financial benefit obtained. Where damage cannot be fully evaluated at criminal judgment, the court could rule on principle and reserve quantification for later proceedings.
This system creates real patrimonial risk without allowing an electoral majority to confiscate the property of former leaders by political declaration.
Integrating the reform into the new European legal framework
Strategic investment control is no longer purely national. The European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2026/1386 on the screening of foreign investments, replacing the previous framework and strengthening cooperation among Member States and the Commission.
French reform must comply with Union law, freedom of movement rules, proportionality, procedural guarantees and the European screening mechanism. Protection measures should be based on objective grounds of security, public order, continuity of essential services or protection of strategic capabilities, not on disguised discrimination according to nationality.
The national register and enhanced duties should therefore interact with European notification and cooperation procedures. Information sharing must respect confidentiality, defence interests and the rights of the companies concerned.
European coordination should not dilute national responsibility. The existence of a Commission opinion or exchanges with other States should not erase who made the French decision, on what basis and with what knowledge.
From doctrine to law
The following texts constitute a working architecture submitted for constitutional, criminal, administrative and European legal expertise. They are not presented as ready-to-enact provisions. Their purpose is to show that the doctrine can be translated into precise rules while preserving legality, non-retroactivity, judicial independence and freedom of governmental action.
I. Draft constitutional law
Article 1 — Responsibility of the President of the Republic
Article 67 of the Constitution would be replaced by the following provisions:
“During the term of office, the President of the Republic may not be required to testify and may not be the subject of proceedings, investigation, prosecution or coercive measure before any French court or administrative authority. Limitation and foreclosure periods are suspended during this period.
One month after the end of office, proceedings may be brought for crimes and offences personally attributable to the former President, including those committed in the exercise of presidential functions, provided the conduct occurred after the entry into force of the constitutional and legislative provisions defining the offence and the applicable penalty.
For acts performed as President, prosecution and coercive measures require prior authorization by the independent Judicial Commission established by organic law.
The President remains subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and to removal under Article 68.”
Article 2 — Responsibility of members of the Government
Article 68-1 would be replaced by the following:
“Members of the Government are criminally responsible for acts performed in office where those acts were classified as crimes or offences when committed.
They are tried by ordinary criminal courts under conditions determined by organic law.
For acts performed in office, prosecution and coercive measures require prior authorization by the independent Judicial Commission, except in cases of flagrante delicto under conditions specified by law.
No proceedings may be based solely on disagreement with the appropriateness of a public policy.”
Article 3 — Abolition of the Court of Justice of the Republic
“Articles 68-2 and 68-3 are repealed.
Pending proceedings are transferred to the competent ordinary courts under transitional arrangements established by organic law, without affecting acts validly performed.”
Article 4 — Application over time
“The provisions concerning criminal liability for acts performed as President or minister apply only to conduct occurring after the entry into force of the statutes defining the offences, penalties and procedural safeguards.”
II. Draft organic law on filtering proceedings
Article 1 — Creation and composition
“An independent Judicial Commission for Applications concerning the Exercise of Executive Power is established.
It consists of seven members appointed for one non-renewable six-year term: three sitting judges of the Court of Cassation, two members of the Conseil d’État and two qualified independent persons selected for recognized expertise in criminal law, public finance, national security or industrial policy.
Members act independently, receive no instruction from political authority and are subject to incompatibility, recusal and conflict-of-interest rules.”
Article 2 — Applications
“The Commission may be seized by the Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation, an investigating court, sixty deputies or senators, or an association approved for at least five years whose statutory purpose includes defence of the fundamental interests of the Nation.
The application sets out the facts, the decision concerned, the alleged participation of the person, the contemplated legal classification and the evidence already available.”
Article 3 — Preliminary checks and preservation of evidence
“Before the Commission’s decision, prosecutors may collect public documents, interview voluntary witnesses and seek judicial orders preserving identified documents or data where there is a serious risk of disappearance or alteration.
They may not initiate public prosecution or order or request coercive measures directed against the protected person before authorization.”
Article 4 — Authorization criterion
“The Commission authorizes prosecution and coercive measures where the application rests on precise and concordant evidence making the alleged offence plausible and the measures sought appear necessary and proportionate.
The Commission rules neither on guilt nor on the final probative value of the evidence.”
Article 5 — Decision and appeal
“The Commission issues a reasoned decision within six months.
Its decision may be appealed within fifteen days before a special chamber of the Court of Cassation, which rules within two months.
A refusal does not bar a new application based on new evidence.”
Article 6 — Competent courts
“After authorization, investigation is conducted by specialized sections of the Paris judicial court or another court designated by decree for reasons of impartiality.
Offences are tried by a specialized collegiate formation. Appeals are heard by a similarly specialized chamber.
Judges who participated in the Commission may not later take part in investigation, prosecution or judgment.”
III. Draft law on protection of strategic assets
Article 1 — Relationship with existing law
“These provisions complement the foreign-investment control regime under Articles L. 151-3 and following of the Monetary and Financial Code and sectoral protection arrangements. They do not replace existing criminal offences.”
Article 2 — Definition of a strategic asset
“A strategic asset is any company, infrastructure, technology, industrial capacity, data set, patent, software, supply chain or know-how whose loss of control, interruption or transfer is capable of causing serious harm to the fundamental interests of the Nation within the meaning of Article 410-1 of the Criminal Code.”
Article 3 — Classification, review and challenge
“Classification results from a formal and reasoned decision after the opinion of a National Strategic Assets Commission.
Classification is imposed for no more than five years and may be renewed after re-examination. It may be lifted before expiry when conditions no longer justify it.
The decision may be protected by a legally recognized secret. It is nevertheless notified to authorities empowered to decide relevant transactions and to the entity concerned in a form compatible with that secret.
Criminal liability based on classification requires proof that the decision-maker personally knew of it at the time of the decision.
Classification may be challenged before the competent administrative court. Its legality may be assessed by the criminal court under Article 111-5 of the Criminal Code where it determines the criminal proceedings.”
Article 4 — Mandatory prior assessment
“Any transaction capable of transferring control, intellectual property or an essential capability attached to a strategic asset is subject to a written assessment covering the ultimate beneficiary, security consequences, technological dependencies, alternative solutions, employment and industrial continuity, protection of data and know-how, and proposed safeguards.
The competent authority may not decide before receiving that assessment and the written warnings issued by competent services.”
Article 5 — Reasons and conflicts of interest
“An authority deciding to depart from convergent adverse advice personally gives written reasons.
Those reasons set out the public-interest considerations supporting the transaction, safeguards obtained, monitoring arrangements and alternatives examined.
Any person participating in preparation or decision discloses direct or indirect interests capable of affecting impartiality and withdraws where required.”
Article 6 — Deliberate breach of a strategic duty
“A person holding public authority and empowered to decide a transaction concerning a classified strategic asset who, with personal knowledge of the classification and of a written, detailed warning identifying a serious and directly foreseeable risk, deliberately breaches a legal or regulatory duty of assessment, transmission, disclosure, abstention or written reasoning, thereby making authorization possible, is punishable by ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of one million euros, which may be increased to twice the advantage obtained or loss avoided.
The same penalties apply to intentional falsification, concealment, alteration or removal of decisive information in order to obtain authorization.
The subsequent occurrence of damage, in the absence of the preceding elements, cannot alone establish the offence.”
This new offence would not replace existing classifications. Corruption, influence peddling, unlawful taking of interests, favouritism, breach of trust, espionage, obstruction or other offences would continue to apply where their elements are established.
Article 7 — Additional penalties and confiscation
“Convicted persons may be declared ineligible and prohibited from public office within constitutional and statutory limits.
The court orders confiscation of the object or direct or indirect proceeds of the offence.
Where these cannot be seized, value confiscation may be ordered under ordinary conditions.
Property unrelated to the offence may be confiscated only where personal enrichment or criminal origin is established as provided by law.”
Article 8 — Compensation sought by the State
“The State may appear as a civil party to obtain compensation for direct, certain and documented expenditure caused by the offence, including costs of rebuilding a capacity, emergency procurement, securing infrastructure, recovering data or replacing a strategic supplier.
Where the full damage cannot be evaluated at criminal judgment, the court may determine the principle of liability and reserve quantification for later proceedings.
Compensation is assessed according to causation, seriousness of fault, personal participation and any financial advantage obtained.
Hypothetical macroeconomic losses, uncertain future revenue and general valuations of lost sovereignty cannot alone justify compensation.”
Article 9 — Preservation of strategic archives
“Documents and data concerning strategic assets are retained for no less than thirty years, without prejudice to longer archival periods.
This duty covers email, professional messaging, official telephones, interministerial platforms and private devices used for public functions.
No protocol or internal instruction may authorize destruction of records subject to a judicial preservation order.”
Article 10 — Aggravated obstruction of justice
“Article 434-4 of the Criminal Code is supplemented as follows:
‘Where the conduct concerns a document or data subject to a prior judicial preservation order and relates to a strategic asset, the penalties are increased to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 375,000 euros.’”
Article 11 — Searches of institutional premises
“The Code of Criminal Procedure specifies conditions for searches at the Presidency, the Prime Minister’s office, ministries and other premises exercising constitutional functions.
Such operations are authorized by a collegiate panel of judges. The decision specifies the offences sought, relevant periods, premises and categories of data.
Where classified information is involved, operations follow Article 56-4 and applicable defence-secrecy procedures.
During the presidential mandate, searches may not have the purpose or effect of circumventing the inviolability provided by Article 67.”
Article 12 — European Union law
“Measures under this law comply with Regulation (EU) 2026/1386 on screening investments in the Union, Union freedoms, proportionality and procedural rights.
They are based on objective criteria of security, public order, continuity of essential services or protection of strategic capabilities and may not constitute disguised discrimination.”
IV. Implementing regulations
A first decree of the Conseil d’État would organize the national strategic-assets register, classification procedure, secure notification, periodic review and administrative appeal.
A second decree would define the organization and registry of the Judicial Commission, filing conditions, confidentiality and secure handling of classified material.
Technical orders could update categories of sensitive technologies. They could neither define an offence nor create a criminal duty not provided by statute.
A reform intended to improve decisions before punishing faults
The reform’s first purpose would not be to send more former leaders to court. It would be to improve decisions before damage occurs.
A minister who knows that an arbitration must be reasoned, archived and potentially examined years later will have an incentive to demand stronger assessments, preserve warnings, identify the real beneficiary and negotiate enforceable safeguards.
Responsibility would also strengthen the moral authority of public power. The State requires citizens to obey the law, companies to identify decision-makers and public accountants to explain their conduct. It cannot indefinitely accept that the most consequential decisions are the least traceable.
Exemplarity does not mean that a leader may never be wrong. It means that warnings must not be concealed, procedures falsified or conflicts hidden.
Functional protection should cover the responsible official who gathered competent advice, examined alternatives, explained the decision and acted without personal benefit, even if the policy later failed.
It should not protect someone who deliberately concealed a warning, falsified a file, breached a precise protective duty or used public office for private interest.
Conclusion
A mature democracy does not merely elect leaders and replace them at the end of a term. It organizes the conditions under which they can decide, records their choices and determines how serious offences may later be judged.
Presidential protection must prevent paralysis during the mandate. It must not produce permanent non-liability for offences committed in office. Ministers must be protected against proceedings based solely on political disagreement, but should not enjoy a special court unavailable to ordinary citizens.
The reform must not be retroactive, vague or directed at one individual. It must be general, prospective and subject to independent courts. It must distinguish an error from an offence, a failed policy from deliberate concealment, and political responsibility from criminal liability.
Governing France should not confer the right to endanger the Nation’s strategic heritage without ever risking personal responsibility.
The office must be protected, the decision reasoned, the evidence preserved and the fault proved. Where an offence is established, the office must no longer serve as permanent shelter.