The cyber risk to French critical infrastructure is neither unknown nor recent. The decisive problem is the delay between the alert, the decision, the funding, the correction and verification on the ground.
Foreword: the problem is no longer just knowing, but acting
On August 21, 2026, Le Figaro published an article with a particularly worrying headline: “Hacked water networks, threatened factories… The FBI alert that raises the specter of industrial failures in France.” At first glance, the news may give the impression of a new threat, emerging in the United States and liable to cross the Atlantic. A chronological reading of French, European and American texts, however, leads to a much more disturbing conclusion: the vulnerability of essential industrial systems is neither unknown, nor recent, nor without precedent.
For more than a decade, France has built a legal framework to protect its vital operators. ANSSI (the French National Cybersecurity Agency) has documented incidents in the water sector, equipment exposed to the Internet, old installations and very uneven levels of maturity. The European Union, for its part, has adopted new cybersecurity and resilience obligations. Yet some transpositions fell far enough behind to bring France before the Court of Justice of the European Union. Meanwhile, in summer 2026 the United States reported attacks on water-system programmable controllers causing pressure losses and flooding, then an active campaign targeting Siemens S7 controllers using, among other things, exploitation scripts assisted by artificial intelligence. [1][2][3][4][9][10][11]
Methodological and legal note
This report deliberately distinguishes three levels. First, facts established by official documents or identified press sources. Second, the political questions that these facts make legitimate. Third, the editorial opinion expressed by Delta-Sierra. The word “incompetence,” where used, refers here to a political assessment of the quality of steering, decision-making or execution; it is not an assertion of a criminal offense nor the attribution of personal fault to all State employees.
Likewise, this text does not claim that an attack belonging to the American campaign against Siemens S7 controllers has been observed in France. The sources used make it possible to establish the existence of an active threat in the United States, the existence in France of comparable structural vulnerabilities and the existence of French compromises in the water and energy sectors. They do not allow these three elements to be conflated. This distinction is essential to the soundness of the report. [3][8][11][12]
The timeline on one page
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2013 | The military programming law organizes the cyber protection of operators of vital importance. [1] |
| 2016 | A specific order governs the security of information systems of vital importance in the “Water management” sector. [2] |
| 2021–2024 | ANSSI handles events affecting 46 entities in the water sector and documents recurring vulnerabilities. [3] |
| Oct. 17, 2024 | European deadline for transposing NIS 2 and the directive on the resilience of critical entities. [4][9] |
| March 12, 2025 | The Senate adopts at first reading the French bill transposing these texts and strengthening resilience. [5] |
| June 2025 | The Cour des comptes (French Court of Audit) calls in particular for stronger interministerial steering of the cyber response. [6] |
| Jan. 22, 2026 | CERT-FR still finds French compromises in water and energy and publishes hardening recommendations. [8] |
| Apr. 29, 2026 | The European Commission refers France to the CJEU over the directive on critical entities. [9] |
| July 8, 2026 | New referral to the CJEU, this time over the complete transposition of NIS 2. [4] |
| July 30, 2026 | The FBI reports attacks on PLCs in American water networks, with pressure losses and flooding. [10] |
| Aug. 19, 2026 | The Prime Minister acknowledges that few ministries are at the required level; on the same day, the United States issues an alert on Siemens S7 controllers. [11][13] |
| Aug. 20, 2026 | Siemens says it has detected neither an increase in attacks nor an unknown vulnerability; the risk rests notably on already known configuration errors. [12] |
| August 21, 2026 | The risk of industrial failures enters the French public debate through the national press. |
One element further strengthens the argument: on August 19, 2026, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu publicly acknowledged that “few ministries are at the required level” in cybersecurity and asked for a new cyber unit to be created within ANSSI. On the same day, the American agencies issued their alert on Siemens S7 controllers. This coincidence does not prove a French failure on the S7 controllers, but it gives the debate a new political dimension: the State’s problem of cyber maturity is now acknowledged at the highest level.
I. Thirteen years of alerts and standards: the scenario was not invisible
December 18, 2013: France officially recognizes the cyber threat against its vital infrastructure
The military programming law of December 18, 2013 introduces a set of provisions specific to protecting vital infrastructure against the cyber threat. The Prime Minister is entrusted with defining policy and coordinating government action on the security and defense of information systems, while special obligations are laid down for operators whose serious impairment could reduce the economic potential, security or survival capacity of the Nation. [1]
This date already rules out a first rhetorical easy way out: that of surprise. In 2013, the State officially regards a cyberattack on an essential infrastructure as a strategic risk serious enough to justify specific rules. This obviously does not mean that all future vulnerabilities were known. It means that the risk of compromise of critical infrastructure has long belonged to the field of national security.
June 17, 2016: water becomes subject to specific rules
Three years later, a specific order sets the security rules and reporting procedures applicable to information systems of vital importance in the “Water management” sector. The operators concerned must in particular identify their critical systems, apply security rules, keep their network mapping up to date and report certain categories of incidents to ANSSI. The order came into force on July 1, 2016 and remains in force in 2026. [2]
The legal framework has therefore existed for a decade. But it does not cover all French installations uniformly. Water management is fragmented among local authorities, inter-municipal bodies, syndicates, public utilities, private concession holders, integrators and service providers. This heterogeneity is precisely one of the risk factors that ANSSI would later highlight: a large national operator and a small local utility do not have the same skills, the same budget or the same ability to replace old industrial automation systems.
2021 to 2024: French incidents are already no longer theoretical
On November 28, 2024, CERT-FR published “Water sector: state of the cyber threat.” In it, the agency states that between January 2021 and August 2024, 46 entities in the water management sector were hit by a cyber event handled by ANSSI. It describes a sector exposed to opportunistic cybercriminals, to destabilization actors and, to a lesser extent, to espionage or strategic pre-positioning activities. [3]
The technical diagnosis is particularly important. ANSSI highlights a legacy of sometimes old installations, the geographic dispersion of sites, sometimes low security budgets, very varied levels of maturity and industrial interfaces accessible from the Internet. The spread of remote management increases the attack surface. Industrial protocols historically designed for availability and simplicity, not for a hostile Internet, may offer insufficient protection in terms of authentication or encryption. [3]
A supervision interface or an industrial controller is not a simple office workstation. It can control a pump, a valve, a chemical dosing system, a reservoir level, a pressure or a motor. From that moment, a cyberattack can become a physical event. This shift lies at the heart of the 2026 situation.
October 17, 2024: the European deadline passes
The NIS 2 directive and the directive on the resilience of critical entities were designed to broaden and harmonize cybersecurity and continuity obligations for essential services. The transposition deadline was October 17, 2024. France does not complete its transposition on time. European proceedings follow, up to referrals to the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2026. [4][9]
A law alone does not stop a hacker. It replaces neither a firewall, nor network segmentation, nor strong authentication. But it sets the scope of the organizations concerned, their obligations, the supervisory authorities, the reporting procedures and the consequences of a breach. When the level of threat rises faster than regulatory and operational capacity, legal delay becomes a factor delaying the generalization of protection.
March 12, 2025: the Senate votes, but the clock keeps ticking
The Government tabled a bill on the resilience of critical infrastructure and the strengthening of cybersecurity. The Senate adopted it at first reading on March 12, 2025. The bill then continued its parliamentary journey. The subject is therefore identified, worked on and politically recognized. That is precisely what makes the length of the procedure hard to separate from the debate on steering: the threat does not suspend its timetable while the law follows its own. [5]
June 2025: the Cour des comptes calls for stronger interministerial steering
In June 2025, the Cour des comptes published a report on the State’s response to cyber threats against civilian information systems. It acknowledges the progress made but calls in particular for stronger interministerial steering, better planning of resources and greater awareness of cyber issues among public leaders. [6]
This assessment is particularly important for this report. It shows that the problem is not only technical. An organization can have good engineers, good analysts and good alerts while retaining a weakness in governance. In other words, the question is no longer only “did we see the risk?”, but “who has the authority, the budget and the timetable to get it fixed?”
2024: small local authorities reveal fragile preparedness
A study published by Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr among elected officials and staff of local authorities with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants reveals a very uneven level of preparedness. Only a minority of the local authorities surveyed say they are well prepared for a cyberattack, while human, budgetary and procedural resources often appear limited. It would be wrong to infer that these authorities’ water networks are necessarily vulnerable; the survey does, however, document a structural difficulty of cyber maturity in the local ecosystem. [7]
January 22, 2026: ANSSI still finds compromises in water and energy
On January 22, 2026, CERT-FR published new recommendations for French players in the energy and water sectors. The agency states that for several months it has received numerous reports of French entities being targeted by hacktivist groups and that it has observed several compromises in these sectors. It again describes equipment accessible from the Internet, sometimes without sufficient authentication, sometimes protected by default credentials, and industrial protocols exposed without appropriate safeguards. [8]
CERT-FR goes so far as to recommend, when minimum security measures cannot be deployed, disconnecting the installation from the Internet and managing it locally. It also reports a case that caused a wind farm to shut down for several hours. This is January 2026: these elementary weaknesses are therefore not just relics of old reports; they are still being observed on the ground. [8]
April 29, then July 8, 2026: two European legal actions
On April 29, 2026, the European Commission decided to refer France to the Court of Justice of the European Union over the transposition of the directive on the resilience of critical entities. On July 8, 2026, a new referral concerned the failure to notify a complete transposition of NIS 2. France is not the only State concerned, which rules out presenting these proceedings as a French peculiarity. They nonetheless constitute an objective indicator of the delay on two texts directly linked to cybersecurity and to the resilience of essential services. [4][9]
July 30, 2026: in the United States, cyberattacks produce physical effects
On July 30, the FBI and the Environmental Protection Agency issued an alert on attacks targeting Rockwell Automation / Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1100 and 1400 controllers in water and wastewater facilities in several American states. Attackers gained access to Internet-exposed equipment, changed IP addresses and passwords among other things, and caused losses of visibility or control. [10]
The tipping point lies in the effects described: the FBI reports in particular pressure losses and flooding. A drop in pressure in a water network can, depending on the circumstances, allow untreated water to enter the pipes. The issue is therefore no longer only the confidentiality of data or the availability of software. Cyberattacks can alter the physical conditions of an essential service. [10]
August 19, 2026: on the same day, the State acknowledges its weaknesses and the United States issues an alert on Siemens S7 controllers
August 19, 2026 is now a pivotal date. On one side, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu acknowledged, in a letter made public, that “few ministries are at the required level” in cybersecurity and considered the situation unacceptable. He asked ANSSI to set up a new cyber unit able to provide a more responsive operational answer to attacks targeting the State. [13]
“Few ministries are at the required level.” — Sébastien Lecornu, Prime Minister, August 19, 2026 [13]
On the other side of the Atlantic, the NSA, CISA, the FBI, the Department of Energy and the EPA issued a joint alert on an active threat against Siemens S7 controllers. The agencies describe actors using Internet scanning services to find exposed or poorly protected equipment, and exploitation scripts generated or assisted by artificial intelligence, sometimes disguised as legitimate monitoring tools. Water, energy, manufacturing, chemicals and food processing are among the sectors concerned. [11]
This simultaneity obviously does not mean that the Prime Minister’s letter was responding to the Siemens alert, nor that an S7 campaign has been observed in France. It does, however, show two converging realities: just as the industrial threat is becoming more professional and can be accelerated by artificial intelligence, the head of Government himself acknowledges that the cyber level of many ministries is not what it should be.
August 20, 2026: Siemens provides an indispensable counterpoint
The next day, Siemens said it had detected neither an increase in the number of attacks targeting its industrial control systems nor an unknown vulnerability. The company specified that the American advisory draws attention in particular to the exploitation of already documented configuration errors. This counterpoint must be kept: the report must not artificially create the image of a new secret flaw that would make all Siemens controllers vulnerable by nature. [12]
Paradoxically, this nuance strengthens rather than weakens the underlying question. If a large part of the risk rests on configuration errors, directly exposed systems, old versions or insufficient hardening measures, we come back precisely to the problem ANSSI has been describing for several years: the difficulty of getting basic rules applied everywhere, down to dispersed and aging installations. [3][8][12]
August 21, 2026: the debate reaches the French press
It is in this context that the Le Figaro article behind this report appeared. Taken in isolation, the headline may give the impression of a new risk. Placed back in the timeline, it looks more like the latest episode in a long series: a legal framework since 2013, sector rules since 2016, French incidents recorded since 2021, European delays from 2024, new findings of compromise in January 2026, physical attacks on water in the United States in July, political acknowledgment of ministerial weaknesses and an American industrial alert in August.
The real debate is therefore no longer “could we have known?” It becomes: “we already knew a great deal; between the technical alert, the political decision, the funding and verification on the ground, where is the time being lost?”
II. When a foreign service gives warning: four instructive precedents
To understand the difficulty of turning intelligence into action, we need to step outside cybersecurity for a moment. Recent history offers several precedents in which foreign information, a signal or an analysis had circulated before a serious event. None of these cases supports the claim that a warning was mechanically enough to prevent the event. They do show, however, that receiving information, interpreting it correctly and acting in time are three different operations.
2014–2015: the Spanish report on Ayoub El-Khazzani before the Thalys attack
Parliamentary work on the 2015 attacks revisits the case of Ayoub El-Khazzani. The French services had been alerted by their Spanish counterparts; he then reappeared in Germany and later in Belgium. On August 21, 2015, he boarded the Amsterdam–Paris Thalys heavily armed and was finally overpowered by passengers. [15]
This case does not allow the conclusion that a French service had sufficient operational intelligence to intercept the attacker with certainty before he acted. It does, however, reveal the problem of how signals circulate, are harmonized and are exploited between European countries. One of the officials heard summed up the difficulty by explaining that information must be able to reach, in real time, a service capable of assessing it. [15]
2015: the Bataclan, Abaaoud, Mostefaï and the “overall failure of intelligence”
After the November 2015 attacks, the National Assembly’s commission of inquiry analyzed the information held by the various services, the exchanges with foreign partners and the limits of the monitoring of several protagonists. The hearings show partial knowledge of certain networks and difficulties in tracking individuals moving between Syria, Belgium, Turkey, Greece and France. [14]
“The 2015 attacks represent an overall failure of intelligence.” — Patrick Calvar, then Director General of the DGSI [14]
This sentence is important because it comes from the head of the service himself. It does not mean that the officers did not work or that they were individually “incompetent.” It means that a complex system can fail despite existing information, surveillance and cooperation. This is exactly the distinction that must be kept when examining critical infrastructure today: criticizing the decision chain is not the same as despising the professionals who produce the alerts.
2021–2022: the United States anticipates the Russian invasion of Ukraine more firmly than Paris
Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States and the United Kingdom took a much more alarmist view of the Russian troop concentrations. The French services had allied information but interpreted Moscow’s intentions differently. After the war broke out, the Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, General Thierry Burkhard, publicly acknowledged that the Americans had correctly anticipated the attack. [24]
“The Americans said the Russians were going to attack; they were right.” — General Thierry Burkhard, March 2022 [24]
This precedent is particularly useful because it concerns not the transmission of information but its interpretation. Intelligence is not just a flow of data. It must be turned into an assessment, then into a decision. Accurate information can therefore lose its value if it is filtered through an analytical framework that is too reassuring or too rigid.
2017: MacronLeaks, the counter-example that proves cooperation can work
To be intellectually honest, we must also examine the cases where the chain works. Before the 2017 French presidential election, American and French warnings about influence operations and intrusion attempts targeting Emmanuel Macron’s campaign led to stronger preparation. When emails and documents were finally released shortly before the second round, the measures taken by the authorities, the media and the campaign helped limit the effect of the operation. [17]
This counter-example is crucial. It rules out claiming that international cooperation or intelligence are inherently ineffective. They can produce a concrete result when the warning is understood, responsibilities are clear and measures are prepared in time. The question then becomes more demanding: why does this transformation of warning into action work in some cases and not quickly enough in others?
III. What is intelligence for if the last mile of decision-making does not follow?
Intelligence exists to support decisions
Among its missions, the DGSI (the French domestic intelligence service) lists the search for, centralization and exploitation of intelligence relevant to national security and the fundamental interests of the Nation. The National Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Coordination is responsible for promoting coherence in the services’ action and for keeping the President of the Republic informed. The principle is clear: the purpose of intelligence is not to produce fine confidential reports, but to inform decisions. [18][19]
In the cyber field, the ecosystem is also considerable: ANSSI, CERT-FR, intelligence services, ministries, judicial authorities, operators, sector CSIRTs, European partners and allies. ANSSI takes part in European exchange networks, and in 2026 France chairs the G7 cybersecurity working group. The channels of cooperation therefore do exist. [25][26]
The “last mile” of national security
The weak point may lie between detection and correction. An expert identifies an exposed interface. A memo goes up the chain. A recommendation is published. Then it must be decided who pays, who decides, who imposes, who schedules the shutdown of the installation, who replaces a twenty-year-old controller, who checks the contractor, who verifies that the measure is applied and who accepts responsibility for a temporary service interruption to avoid a more serious risk.
This is what could be called the last mile of national security. An intelligence chain can be technically excellent and lose part of its usefulness if the last mile is not covered. In the water sector, the dispersion of players makes this problem particularly visible: the State can issue warnings, but the concrete correction may depend on a local authority, a public utility, a concession holder, an industrial contractor or a budget voted locally.
Why so much effort if the decision does not follow?
The question may seem provocative, but it deserves to be asked. France mobilizes analysts, engineers, police officers, soldiers, diplomats, magistrates, operations centers and considerable technical resources to detect threats as early as possible. This spending only makes sense if the information advantage gained makes it possible to gain time over the adversary.
The adversary, however, needs no budget vote, interministerial circular or approval meeting to test a vulnerable configuration found on the Internet. Artificial intelligence further reduces the cost of certain steps of research, script writing and tool adaptation. The danger is therefore not only that the attacker becomes more powerful; it is that the attacker’s decision cycle becomes vastly shorter than the defender’s. [11]
If information arrives quickly but action arrives slowly, the State can find itself in a paradoxical situation: better informed than before, but unable to turn that knowledge into risk reduction quickly enough. The problem is then less a lack of intelligence than the organization of will.
IV. Can we speak of “political incompetence”?
The term is severe. Used as a personal and general accusation, it would be intellectually lazy. Used as a political assessment of measurable results, however, it is open to discussion. Four objective elements feed this question today.
1. The Prime Minister himself acknowledges an insufficient ministerial level
On August 19, 2026, the head of Government stated that few ministries are at the required level in cybersecurity and called this situation unacceptable. This statement carries particular weight: it comes neither from the opposition, nor from a columnist, nor from an activist. It comes from the person responsible for government coordination, at the very moment when the State has just suffered several major attacks. [13]
It is therefore hard to argue that criticism of the State’s lack of cyber preparedness is purely polemical. The finding exists at the top of the executive. The political question is why it took until 2026, after years of reports, for this shortcoming to be stated so clearly.
2. The Cour des comptes points to governance, resources and steering
The Cour des comptes does not merely list technical vulnerabilities. It calls for stronger interministerial steering, better planning of resources and greater involvement of leaders. When the institution responsible for evaluating public action insists on governance, the debate on political competence is no longer merely a matter of tone. [6]
3. European delays end up in court
In 2026, France was referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union in two cases linked to cybersecurity and the resilience of critical entities. France is not alone, but these proceedings constitute an objectively verifiable administrative and political fact. They show that between European agreement on the objectives and their complete translation into national law, the timetable was not met. [4][9]
4. Elementary weaknesses are still being found
Finally, in 2026 ANSSI still has to recall principles as basic as not exposing sensitive industrial equipment directly to the Internet, removing default passwords, using secure access mechanisms and, where necessary, disconnecting from the Internet. These rules are not new: CISA and Siemens have been repeating them for years in their advisories on industrial systems. [8][21][22]
Taken in isolation, none of these elements proves an overall “incompetence” of the State. Taken together, they allow a much more precise political assessment: there is a persistent difficulty of governance, harmonization and implementation that can be described as political incompetence when officials have the warning, the authority and the time needed but fail to obtain an effective correction.
A word about the staff and the services: do not aim at the wrong target
This report would be unfair if it directed its criticism at ANSSI, DGSI officers, engineers, police officers or soldiers simply because they belong to the State. The documents cited show precisely that many of them are sounding the alarm. Patrick Calvar himself spoke of an intelligence failure after 2015. The Cour des comptes produces recommendations. ANSSI publishes advisories that make vulnerabilities visible. Political criticism begins precisely where expertise is not sufficiently turned into decisions, resources and obligations. [3][6][8][14]
V. The security of water, energy and industry: an issue directly linked to the fundamental interests of the Nation
Article 410-1 of the French Penal Code defines the fundamental interests of the Nation broadly. It covers in particular national independence, territorial integrity, security, the means of defense and diplomacy, the protection of the population, the balance of the environment and the essential elements of the country’s scientific and economic potential. [20]
This definition resonates directly with the infrastructure examined here. Water concerns the protection of the population. Energy underpins economic continuity and security. Industrial processes contribute to economic potential. Digital networks now run through all these sectors.
A fundamental legal distinction must nevertheless be kept: asserting that a bad policy helps expose the fundamental interests of the Nation does not mean that an official is criminally committing an “attack on the fundamental interests of the Nation.” An offense requires a precise text, constituent elements and evidence. This report concerns political and administrative responsibility, not the imputation of a crime or misdemeanor.
VI. The questions the State should answer publicly
- How many industrial controllers used in French water and sanitation networks are still directly or indirectly accessible from the Internet?
- How many are protected only by mechanisms now considered insufficient or by default credentials?
- What national inventory exists for the controllers used in essential infrastructure, and what share of this inventory is kept up to date?
- After the American alert of July 30, 2026, what checks were requested from French water operators?
- After the August 19, 2026 alert on Siemens S7 controllers, what instructions were sent to French operators, and how quickly?
- Was non-public technical information exchanged between American and French services about this campaign? If so, on what date and to which authorities?
- Which body checks that ANSSI’s recommendations are actually applied in small structures that do not fall directly under the historical regime for operators of vital importance (OIV)?
- Who pays for replacing an obsolete industrial controller when a small local authority lacks the necessary resources?
- How many operators can switch to manual or degraded operation if their supervision system is compromised?
- Who ultimately bears the responsibility for checking that a warning has become a correction and that the correction has been verified?
Answering these questions would be more useful than a general statement asserting that “the services are mobilized.” Mobilization is not the result. The result is measured by the disappearance of the vulnerability, the ability to detect an intrusion, the continuity of service and the time needed to return to a safe state.
VII. Is anyone flying the plane?
It would be wrong to write that the State does nothing. France has a competent national agency, powerful intelligence services, active European and international cooperation, legal texts, reporting mechanisms and many professionals working daily to reduce risks. The problem is precisely that this impressive architecture still coexists with weaknesses that its own institutions have been describing for several years.
What is worrying is not the absence of reports, but their accumulation. Not the absence of warnings, but their repetition. Not the absence of international cooperation, but the uncertainty about how quickly certain information becomes verifiable action on the ground. And not the absence of technical competence, but the question of the political competence to prioritize, fund, impose and verify.
In a modern State, intelligence serves to gain time. If we have to wait until a known vulnerability is exploited, data are stolen or a physical process is disrupted to unblock the decision that should have been taken beforehand, then the advantage provided by intelligence has been largely lost.
The real scandal would not be an unknown vulnerability being exploited tomorrow. No State can promise zero risk. The real scandal would be a French water network, energy installation or factory suffering heavy consequences because of a weakness already identified, reported and documented for years.
@ANSSI_FR @gouvernementFR @Ecologie_Gouv
Hello, is there anyone in the chain of command?
And as for the DGSI, since intelligence officially serves to inform political decisions, couldn’t someone send them a little text message along the lines of: “Bosses, wake up!”
We knew. So, between the moment the information goes up the chain and the moment the vulnerability is actually fixed, who is flying the plane?
Sources and references
Primary, institutional and press sources used in the report.
- [1] Légifrance — Law No. 2013-1168 of December 18, 2013, chapter on the protection of vital infrastructure against the cyber threat.
- [2] Légifrance — Order of June 17, 2016 on information systems of vital importance in the “Water management” sector.
- [3] ANSSI / CERT-FR — Water sector: state of the cyber threat, CERTFR-2024-CTI-011, November 28, 2024.
- [4] European Commission — Action of July 8, 2026 concerning the transposition of NIS 2 by France and three other States.
- [5] French Senate — Bill on the resilience of critical infrastructure and the strengthening of cybersecurity, legislative file.
- [6] Cour des comptes — The State’s response to cyber threats against civilian information systems, June 2025.
- [7] Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr — 2024 study on the cybersecurity of local authorities with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants.
- [8] ANSSI / CERT-FR — Recommendations for players in the energy and water sectors, CERTFR-2025-DUR-003.
- [9] European Commission — Infringement package of April 29, 2026: referral to the CJEU concerning the directive on the resilience of critical entities.
- [10] FBI — Malicious cyber actors targeting water and wastewater sector Internet-facing PLCs, July 30, 2026.
- [11] WaterISAC — Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Active Targeting of Siemens S7 PLCs, summary of the American interagency alert.
- [12] Reuters / Boursorama — Siemens’ reaction to the American alert: no detected increase in attacks and no unknown vulnerability, August 20, 2026.
- [13] TF1 Info / AFP — Sébastien Lecornu: “Few ministries are at the required level” in cybersecurity, August 19, 2026.
- [14] National Assembly — Inquiry report on the means deployed by the State to fight terrorism since January 7, 2015.
- [15] National Assembly — Hearing on cooperation and intelligence: the Thalys case and the Spanish report on Ayoub El-Khazzani.
- [16] National Assembly — Follow-up report on the conclusions of the commission of inquiry into the 2015 attacks.
- [17] U.S. Senate / Congress — Report on Russian interference and the French experience during the 2017 presidential election.
- [18] DGSI — Official presentation of the missions of the General Directorate for Internal Security.
- [19] Élysée — National Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Coordination: coordination and decision-support missions.
- [20] Légifrance — French Penal Code, Article 410-1: definition of the fundamental interests of the Nation.
- [21] CISA — Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 CPUs, industrial advisory of January 21, 2025.
- [22] CISA — Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 and S7-1500 CPU Families: security advisory and network isolation recommendations.
- [23] National Assembly — Sitting of May 5, 2026: debate on the State’s cyber weaknesses after the attack on the ANTS.
- [24] Le Monde — Interview with General Thierry Burkhard on the differences of analysis before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, March 2022.
- [25] ANSSI — 2025 Activity Report and cooperation with French and European CSIRTs.
- [26] ANSSI — French chairmanship of the G7 cybersecurity working group in 2026.

